Because no other amphibious aircraft were available, the s e UF-l and crew returned after a brief lunch at Kwajalein, where the cargd originally meant for Rongerik was offloaded. The UF-l returned to Kwajalein at about -330 with the remaining 20 men from Rongerik (Reference 84). A conference was held at 1330 at which the task force radsaFe officer, the task force and task group commanders, and the Scientific Difector reviewed what was known of the fallout situation. A decision had] been made, albeit at the local level, to evacuate the U.S. personnel on Rofgerik, and aow the other atolls in the vicinity had to be considered. As part of the offsite fallout monitoring program of the Health and Safety Laboratory, postshot flights were conducted over all shalls. Several patterns, designated Able, Baker and Charlie, by VP-29. Able, a flight over the northern Marshalls, was unde 2 March. Before the conference was over, an inflight report from fli indicated 1.350 R/hr at 1340, 2 March, extrapolated to ground 1 Rongelap Island, 0.400 R/hr at 1328 at Ailinginae, and 0.001 R/ at Wotho. at 1300 It was decided that evacuation of Rongelap was necessmry and that other islands likely to be involved would be determined fr the readings of the remaining portion of the flight Able pattern (ReEerence 26). Accordingly, the destroyer Philip left for Rongelap immediatBly. structions were issued to dispatch an Air Force SA-16 amphibian In- Flight with two radsafe monitors to check surface conditions at Rongelap before dark. The destroyer was directed to be off Rongelap ready to start evacu- ation at dawn the following day. A Trust Territory representatife and an interpreter were requested to move by PBM seaplane from Kwajaleig rive at Rongelap at the same time. The SA-16 flight was set up to ar@gnd the two monitors were especially briefed to make readings at waist hdight, to use several meters of the same type for comparison, and to use djfferent types for cross-checking. 227