"7 rakeANLR: Entirely too much time was used to decontaminate aircrpft and excessive exposures were being accumulated by aircraft maintenance personnel who participated in decontaminathion. Maintenance crews in the 4930th Test Support Group (Test Shpport Unit) For aL did not assist with aircraft decontamination after the BRAVO shot. subsequent shots, although personnel from the TSuU were still nonmaintenance personnel were used. Involved, These men were assigned t@ decontami- nation teams of 15 men each that operated on 6-hour shifts. 7.4, which was primarily responsible for aircraft operations, was most infolved in this. Holmes & Narver constructed the Enewetak decontamination pad used for the CASTLE aircraft. This pad drained toward a 24-inch (6l-cm] central catch basin that drained into the lagoon through an 8-inch (204cm) pipe. The general procedure for decontamination operations was: 1. On D-day sampler F-84G, WB~29, and FB-36 aircraft 2. All other aircraft were checked on landing for evidence of radiological contamination. If an aircrafft was contaminated above 0.025 R/hr, it was isolated and posted. 3. Sampler FB-36 aircraft were parked on the decontam nation pad and checked for radiation intensities. 4. Unless urgency was a factor, no decontamination wa undertaken until D+l. Sampler aircraft were given decontamination priority over those accidentally contaminated. 5. Decontaminated aircraft were released to maintenan personnel before release to flying crews. 6. Before aircraft were cleared for flying again, the radiation intensity at crew positions had to be les than 0.010 R/hr. were parked in the designated hot decay area. Following sequential operations for decontaminating various] aircraft, radiation intensity measurements sometimes increased rather thah Three primary causes were proposed 1. (Reference 30): Wash water (containing a concentrated amount of con taminants) collected in engine cowlings 157 decreased.