other personnel” (Reference 11, p. lla-11). Shot BRAVO "contaminat of the ships to the point that it would have been most desirable to f film badges to all personnel on them... [because] . no film badges received signficant radiation" lla-12). . . many people with (Reference 11, pp. llafll and Sufficient badges were not available, however, and furtherfhore TU 7 lacked the personnel to process a larger number of badges. Evel so, the TU 7 technicians attempted to estimate the doses of those withou badges “based on film badges of similarly exposed personnel, but it impossible to do this accurately in many cases." After BRAVO, more dges became available, with assignment priorities given to "people expecte#i to receive significant radiation and people who had already received a rblatively large amount of radiation" (Reference 11, p. lla-12). Additionally, after BRAVO, a notice from CINCPAC directed all shi entering a circular area within 450 nmi (833 km) of a point near Biki have 5 percent of their crews wear film badges or dosimeters until ou the area. Processing was to be performed when specifically directed CINCPAC (Reference 16, Tab C). There is no indication that it was necesr Sary to process the badges. Two methods of film badging were used in normally noncontaminated areas, i.e., areas not under control of the TG 7.1 Radiation Control Group. The first was area badging. This system involved “spotting” a island or vessel with film badges in key places to provide coverage of living and working areas. Efforts were coordinated with the Radsafe Officer to ensure coverage of areas assigned to each task group. The second method was personnel badging. Film badges to be worn throughout presumed fallout periods were issued to certain individuals, for example, detachment radsafe commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The readings of the personnel and area badges for each detachment} were averaged to make a blanket assessment of total radiation dose to edch ae nene member of the detachment. 102