A higher dose, based on prompt health effects, was incorporated iftto planning for tactical or emergency situations. The tactical dose confept gave broad guidelines to assist command decisions, 100 R would result in no acute effects, thal to half those exposed, etc. i.e., an exposure pf an exposure of 450 R would bef le- (The tactical dose rationale assume the dose would be received as a single lifetime exception to the potential occupational dose.) Planning documents warned the task groups that previous exposure fec- ords should be checked to assure that individuals with prior exposure[did not exceed the MPE. This warning was probably directed to the scient projects of TG 7.1, whose personnel might have been exposed in the la tory, since the previous field test (UPSHOT~KNOTHOLE) ing Ground (later named Nevada Test Site) at the Nevada P had been completed about 9 before CASTLE. The crewmembers of TG 7.4 sampling aircraft were authorized an MPH 20 R for the entire period of Operation CASTLE. of Anyone exposed to th 20 R maximum was to be removed from further work with radioactive matdri- als until sufficient time elapsed to bring his average exposure down 0.3 R per week. It was planned to expose the sampling crews to a max of only 10 R in order to reserve the remainder aS a contingency again accident (Reference 16, p. 26). In addition to the overall exposure limit, specific Maximum Permi sible Limits (MPLs) related to radioactive contamination on parts of body, clothing and personal effects, food, water, air, vehicles and ment, and materials. These MPLs specified either the level of decont nation required or the upper limit for restriction of activity. Tabl lists the CASTLE MPLs. Radiation Exposure Waivers Absolute adherence to the radiological standards prescribed for r tine laboratory or industrial use was recognized as unrealistic for t special conditions of a field test (Reference 9). Provision was made 96 wl