va
The radius of the blast effects of BRAVO, however, was greater th en
expected, and there was concern that the Eneman Site, where the KOON.
@e-
vice was already nearly completely assembled in place, could not effegtively survive blasts at the closer location contemplated for shots UMION,
YANKEE,
ond shot
NECTAR,
and ROMEO.
cCTG 7.1 therefore decided to schedule thefsec-
(which was switched from UNION to ROMEO) on a barge in the wkter-
filled crater formed by BRAVO and move the Eneman surface shot
last shot on the schedule, forward to the third position.
(KOON)
The schedu
the
.2@
aS
of 6 March is given in Table 27.
The dropping of ECHO,
scheduled for
detonation on
the
surface at
Eleleron, to the end of the schedule was related to the fact that the
vice,
like that for KOON
(the Eneman surface device), was to be provi
by the University of California Radiation Laboratory
(UCRL); and as t
date for KOON was moved forward, the extra labor required to prepare
its earlier detonation depleted the ECHO device assembly labor pool.
These shot schedules were based on considerations of the
for test preparations and assumed favorable weather.
did not appear.
time “1...
The favorable
ather
The second test, ROMEO, was not fired until 2 weeks
After
its second scheduled date; KOON was fired 11 days later on 7 April.
A new schedule was promulgated 1 week after the KOON firing, whic
reflected changing test priorities of the Atomic Energy Commission
weapon designers as a result of the first three tests.
{to have been called ECHO)
(
The Eleleron
EC}
hot
was cancelled, and one of the Bikini shot
(NECTAR) was moved to the MIKE crater at Enewetak.
The revised sche
le
as of 13 April for the remaining shots was UNION (16 April), NECTAR
(20 April), YANKEE (27 April).
This final schedule was modified to
verse the NECTAR and YANKEE shot sequence due to weather.
OPERATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
The schedule changes affected DOD operations in several ways.
T
had a considerable investment in preparing for experiments to be con
248
cted