“nat their reported fallout should pose no Significant hazard.]
This re-
ssuring message was not actually sent from the ship until 0509
the fol-
owing day.
A copy of the Rongerik message to JTF 7 was delivered to te CTG 7.4
WREP on Enewetak slightly later in the evening.
Superior,
the Commander,
Test Services Unit,
He conferred
With his
after which a mesdage was
sent to Rongerik ordering the cessation of all operations and
cent Of all personnel in metal buildings.
e place-
A layout of the islamd instal-
ations and a photograph of the stations at Rongerik, showing
natal buildings there, are shown in Figures 63 and 64.
sent just after 2400 on 2 March
e of the
This message was
(Reference 84).
The TG 7.4 officers wanted more information on the situatiof’i
serik.
on Ron-
They decided that the most expedient way to obtain it whs to send
i radsafe advisor to Rongerik aboard a regularly scheduled resupply flight
trom Kwajalein the following morning.
The advisor was sent from
<0 Kwajalein on an 0300 Military Air Transport Service
(MATS)
Enewetak
fight to
catch the resupply flight.
During the night, Enewetak Atoll experienced fallout that rdached a
maximum of 0.010 to 0.015 R/hr.
It had commenced as early as 1945 in rain
at Parry and Enewetak islands with 0.003 to 9.004 R/hr.
REENTRY TO BIKINI
The position of the fleet 24 hours after the shot is shown ih Fig-
ure 65.
The Belle Grove reentered Bikini Lagoon on 2 March.
T
barges, ten LCUs, and ten LCMs that had been left in the lagoon
were heavily contaminated by fallout of the previous day.
H+12 were "several roentgens per hour"
«4
s
at
=
three
Pff Eneu
Intenfities at
(Reference 80).
Decontamination of these small craft consisted of a primary
with high-pressure firehoses, followed by additional hosing and
Yashdown
gcrubbing
by decontamination personnel who were able to safely board the cgaft after
the primary hosing.
The Gypsy was quite effective in working cldse to the
221