3.190 RECOVERY OPERATIONS seem The probiems involved in the recovery of experimental deta following each sl. t were quire similar for all shots in the Bikini area since the conditions established by___i[shct haid throughout the operation. Despite earlier qualms regarding the complexitiesofshlpbuara operation, most recoveries were effected as early as could have been expected, any ren! dela; being for the most part due to radictogical considerations. A certain amount of study of the recovery problemhad preceded the overs:25 phase of the operation. Recovery methods were discussed, and the various support items were laid on. In the field further discussions of recovery methods resulted in a firm operating plan which was then given a full rehearsal with such vehicles, helicopters, or boats as the mission required. The ecovery plan was issued on February 22 as a result of these discussions. It detailed the movements of each project for the period from shot time throughy : when it was felt that the majority of the recoveries would have besa accomplished. The results off __caused this plan to be abandoned, and recovery of data went at a much Slower rate A ln ee Mammo, eS, et &, than planned due to the extensive fall-out in the islands. This experience led to the conclusicn that detailed plans based on assumptions of yield and fall-out patterns were of little value except as they served to acquaint the operations people with the problems involved. Subsequent plans were far less elaborate, allowing leeway for conditions which could not be predicted. Essentially these were lists of the participating projects, the locations of the instrument sta- tions, and the types of vehicles and other support most likely required. Following each shot the CTG 7.1 left the USS Estes to make an initial survey of the atoll to determine the damage to the stations and the radiation levels in critical areas. Upon his return the approximate times for the recovery missions were decided upon, and the early missions were dispatched. Some of these were made while the vessels were at sea, but the majority of the recoveries waited for the reentry of the fleet into the lagoon, when the recovery teams could be collected and dispatched by helicopter or boat. In all cases the recovery missions were closely coordinated with the Rad-Safe Control Officer, who determined that the personnel were properly badged and clothed, and accompanied by a qualified monitor before proceeding into a contaminated area. The J-3 representative aboard the USS Batroko directed the helicopter missions ard made certain that the crews and project personnel were properly briefed. It was found that confuston and misunderstanding could be avoided by requiriag that 211 helicopter recovery missions originate on the carrier in order to bring the people together to talk over the missions. ‘Generally, the recovery time depended on the distance of the station from Ground Zero, but the majority of the recovery missions went out on theday followine the shots whenthe radistion levels had fallen somewhat. . - 8 Precautionary measures were observed on those missions entering hot areas, where engine failure or other mishap could result in dangerous radiation overdose. Helicopters flew in pairs on such missions, passengers were provided with signal flares, battery-operated Motor- ola sets were established in isolated bunkers, and, of utmost importance, special attention was given to the briefing of the crews and passengers on signals to be used. It was apparent that the simplest approach to the problem was the best and that the success of any system was entirely dependent upon the mutual understanding of that system by the pilot and passengers. 3.11. POSTSHOT REENTRY ~ It became apparent! }tnat the Btkini portion of Castle would be conducted from aboard ship. In a way this simplified the operation because the evacuation and reentry problems 49°