to best suit the local conditions. However, barge support should be closely examined for future
operations, Future operations may well look to the barge method as a useful plan for localizing
assembly and delivery operations in a consolidatedinstallation,
4.5
TASK UNIT 6, FIRING PARTY
TU-6 had the responsibility for arming and firing the nuclear devices detonated during the
operation. In general, two teams were utilized for the operation: one was the arming team,
which made test checks of the X units and firing racks prior to the final assembly of the devices and the inspection and test checks of the firing circuitry involved, including the proof
testing of the Go-No-Go interlock circuits; the other was the firing team, which operated the
control equipment used for this purpose. The work of TU-6 was accomplished in close liaison
with TU-4 (assembly for LASL devices), TU-14 (assembly for UCRL devices), and TU-15
(EG&G signal and firing circuits), The missions of the arming and firing teams were accomplished with the aid of detailed check lists which enumerated each operation and the essential
measurements associated with the arming and firing of cach of the nuclear devices, The general
plan of operations used by TU-6 is given separately in the TU-6 Operations Plan.
The original plans provided for firing the various devices from land-based control stations located on Enyu Island, Bikini Atoll, and Parry Island, Eniwetok Atoll, from which wire
electrical circuits originated. These circuits terminated at the vario:s zero points. The first
detonation of the series was
~ for which the firing was accompii:ied by mamually operaee the co:-trol board at Station70, Enyu Island. However, imrmediately following this shot it
a3 decided io fire the remaining devices at Bikini Atoll from aboa: d ‘*e command ship, the
UsS Estes, by means of a radio link from the ship to Station 70. The final shot of the Castle
series,}
was fired from the Control Room on Parry Island. This was the only detona-
tion of fheseries made at Eniwetok Atoll.
During Operation Castle no misfires or other delays were encountered which were due to
the arming or firing operations. Weather difficulties did interfere with the firing schedule,
however, and these delays nece¢sitated arming and disarming all but two of the devices more
than once.
4.6
4.6.1
TASK UNIT 7, RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY
Introduction
TU-T, the Rad-Safe unit for TG 7.1, was a continuation of the Rad-Safe Unit of TG 132.1.
Preliminary to the Castle operational phases, personnel to staff the unit were requested from
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Army furnished 34 persons, and the Navy furnished 11.
Civilian technical advisers of Health Division, LASL, and the U. S. Public Health Service added
to the unit just prior to and during the overseas period.
4.6.2
Task Group Organization for Radiation Safety
Early concepts for Castle indicated a high requirement for radiation-safety monitors. In
past operations these monitors were furnished from personnel of the Rad-Safe Task Unit. The
continuation of this policy would have meant a large vi.wieldy organization and an expensive
service. An alternative «as proposed and acecpted by the Task Group Commander, This al-
ternative was to place radiation-safety responsibility with the commanders and project leaders
om
s
and to require each project to provide its own trained monitors, Training of Rad-Safe monitors
was to be accomplished by Rad-Safe Task Unit personnel. A reserve monitor pool was also to
be established by TG 7.2 in case of emergency need. The monitor, from the unit concept,
would act as radiation-safety adviser to the project leader.
Establishment of this policy enabled TU-7 to recuce its operational personnel to a “small
skeleton staff of 43 personnel supplemented by project monitors of LASL, UCRL, and DOD.
a
ed
64