Wersgall Nevertheless. the AEC declared that Bikini was safe. ‘‘There is virtually no radiation left.’" one AEC official stated in 1969, ‘‘and we can find no discernible effect on plant or animal life.” A Complete Fatlure In 1969 the first Bikinians returned to their atoll! to assist in the resettlement project. The Department of the Interior (DOI) began construction on 40 homes. Bikini Island and Eneu, a nearby island, were bulldozed. and the topsoil was turned over to reduce radiation. By the end of the year, 50,000 new trees were planted on the islands. All signs pointed to a happy ending for the Bikinians. In 1971 the director of the AEC’s Division of Operational! Safety reported that numerous well water samples had been taken from several locations on Bikini Island and that, “‘froma radiological viewpoint, the water is safe to drink.” In late 1973 the United States announced that construction on Bikini was nearly complete. and that ‘if all is acceptable to the people. the trust territory government is prepared to allow them to re- turn to Bikini Aroll permanently by Christ- mas this year."’ As the Bikinians began to return to their atoll, however, DOI recognized chat a new, more thorough. radiological survey of Bikini was needed. In 1972 the AEC had made such a survey of Enewetak. a Marshallese atoll also used as a nuclear test site. Instruments used in the Enewetak survey, such as airborne sensors. were far more sensitive and accurate than the equipment used to conduct the 1967 survey of Bikini. The Enewetak survey was the starting point of a massive cleanup bythe U.S. government. and most of the Enewe- Rogers C. B. Morton,alarmed by the findings of routine. “unsophisticated radiological sur- veys, halted construction on Bikini Island. He wrote to Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger several months later. in March 1975, torequest that a thorough survey be conducted on Bikini, warning that “despite assurances that the atoll is safe, the attirudes and fears of the people are being influenced by various outside groups, many of whom are critics of the nuclear program ” In order to ‘avoid... the loss of our credibility” with the Bikinians, Morton concluded, ‘‘we must answer the critics.” The Interior Department needed the Defense Department's (DOD) logistical support for the survey, for neither Interior nor the Energy Research and Development Admin- istration (ERDA}—successor to the AEC and precursor to the Department of Energy (DOE}—had the logistical capability or the money to conduct the survey. But aithough Morton's letter said that ERDA was prepared to conduct a radiological survey in April. DOD did not even respond until the end of May. when it stated thac it could conduct the survey ata ‘reimbursable cost” of $609.000. Since Interior had no funds for reimbursement. Defense declined to take on the task. DO! tried again in June. Interior bluntly stated in a letter that it was ‘‘deeply concerned that a quality radiological survey such as that performed on Enewetak. whose people will not be coming back for some time, cannot be made available in a timely fashion for the Bikinians whose return is imminent.’’ Warn- ing that ‘‘none of the involved departments has budgeted adequately for this needed and highly warranted effort in order to meet our takese now are being resettled in the southern statutory and moral commitmentsto the peo- free of contamination by the tests. A debate United States required “a strong reaffirmation by all concerned agencies to work together in carrying out a comprehensive program.” But part of their atoll, which was left relatively simmers, however, over whether to permit resettlement of Enjebi, an island in the north whose radiation levels exceed federal stan- ple of this area.”’ the letter concluded that the no survey was conducted. Meanwhile, some Bikinians had expressed dards. In late 1974, Secretary of the Interior a desire to build homesin the interior of the 86. 87.