Wersgall Radiation levels on Eneu are one-eighth the levels on Bikini Island. Both government and independently hired scientists agree chat resettlement on Eneu, even without a rotation system, will result in radiation exposures well within federal radiation protection guidelines, provided the people eat no food from Bikini and maintain a diet consisting of 50 per cent food grown on Eneu and 50 per cent imported food. The Bikinians have given their assurance that they would comply with these conditions and that they would be willing tO accept restrictive measures to insure that they do not violate DOE proscriptions. ~ Given the Bikini Island experience, it is clear that an Eneu resettlement program, ii adopted, cannot be implemented halfway. There must be a special ship purchased and earmarked for supplying Eneu with imported food. There are adequate local crops grow- ing on Eneu. so there will! be little incentive to travel to Bikini to obtain food. Nevertheless. the Bikinian leaders. perhaps together with Marshallese or American officials. would have to take responsibility for keeping the people away from Bikini Island. Moreover. the homes built on Bikini in the early 1970s could prove to be an attractive nuisance and might have to be removed. An Enew rotation program will require good planning and implementation by the United States and sacrifice and self-discipline on the part of the Bikinians. But the people of Bikini strongly support the program, even though it is a far cry from their hopes of returning to Bikini Island. Resettlement on Eneu will accomplish three important objectives. First. it will give the Bikinians an outpost at Bikini Aroll. their homeland. Second, it will insure the active participation of the United States after its trusteeship of the Marshall Islands terminates. Third, a rotation system will reduce each individual's living time on Eneu, thereby minimizing his exposure to radiation. Althoughscientists agree that radiation exposures on Eneu are well within federal 94. standards, every effort should be made to keep exposure as limited as possible. There remains the principal policy ques- tion regarding a resettlement program for the Bikinians raised by Carter's pledge to end the U.S. trusteeship of Micronesia in 1981: Who should negotiate the program and how should it be implemented? In January 1980 the United Sctaces and the Marshalls initialed a Compact of Free Association that will grant a large degree of self-rule to the islands. and the agreement will be submitted to Congress as soon as the other Micronesian govern- ments have signed. The compact provides that the governments of the United States and the Marshall Islands ‘‘shall set forth in a separate agreement provisions for the just and adequate settlement’ of all post-trusteeship nuclear claims issues. ranging from monctary claims to medical trearment, radiological surveillance. and ‘‘such additional programs and activities as may be mutually agreed... .”" The United States continues to treat the Pacific islands as its back- yard dumping grounds. The compact is ambiguous on the question of who should negotiate these programs and how they should be implemented. It states only that the two governments shall confront these matters ‘‘in a separate agreement.” bur it does not specify the parties to the nego- tiations leading to such an agreement and is silent on the question of its implementation. The Marshall Islands government has in- dicated that it intends to negotiate a separate agreement exclusively with the United Scates. It desires direct government-to-government negotiations on these issues. perhaps with token representation by the Bikinians on its delegation. in order to shore up its new sovereignty. To be sure, there are some nuclearrelated matters that should be addressed in this way, such as the responsibility, if any, of the Marshall Islands government to insure 95.