asecetated fallecute Based coWilson 3 reports, 3 recommendation ws ade to turs the flees. around and steam to a point 10 NMsoutinc’ NAN. Upon arriving at thie.- position at about H plus 3 hcurs, sligh® contamination (1 to 3 ar/hr) wae detected on some ships. Since no increase in intensities wes detected cver- s pertod of time, the original recamendatios to collect the flees at this point wae not changed. . Based’on. the observationea of “Llscer 3 and the 0504600 wind observations, the PC béat at RONGERIK wee directed to proceed to a point 50 NM south of . RONGERIK upon completion of their 0900 rewin rum. This wag a precautionary measure taken on the assumption that long-range fall-out from water surface shota might have undesirable charesteristice nct yet observed om previcue shota of this type, and because further wind runs werenot essential, for RONGERIX. Subsequent surveye on Y and Y plual day indicated little or no fall-out occurred at RONGERIK. Based on the preliminary helicopter damage and radsafe suyvey mde Cetweer about H plus 3 and H plus & hours, an alert advisory wa isaued to all task foree unite. This advisory indicated that contamination on NAN, at NAN anchorages and on the airstrip, wee not prohibitive, but that the aire strip was so. debris-ridden as to preclude Might operationa at least on shot day. R-hour was estimated to be at 1330 and CTG 7.3 was directed ts have all shipa off the lagoon entrance by 1300/1 pencing. outcome of the lagoon water sampling of the NAN and HOW ieland anchoregess. The lagoon water sampling effort, having indicated relatively high intensities at. the HOM and NAN anchorages, became the basis for recommending a delay in re-entering the lagoon to allow further decay and diffusion. An appropriate directive was issued designating R-hour as 1600M and declaring water and air traffic to NiN anchorages and the airstrip Radeafe mrestricted provided no landings were made on isl:ncs weet cf SUGAR. <All other traffic was declared radsafe restricted and under the Radsafe Control of the Radsafe CENTER of TG 7.1. Swimming in the lagoon was prohibited until further notice and all units were alerted to the possibility of light secondary fall-out on the afterncon or ewening of Y day. (No secondary fall-out materialized. None of tha task force ships experienced significant fall-out from YANKEE.) On the basis of the ralatively significant contamination at the anchor= ages, it was ultimately decided tc re-enter only with the major ships, 1.e., the ships serving aa the major "hotel" facilities for task force perscnnel. This was in conjunction with the BIKINI roll-up plan and to re-shuffle personnel, some to remain at BIKINI, others to return to ENI"ETOK. Followin. the re-grouping, all ships left the lagoon to remain at sea overenight or tc depart for ENTSTOK according to the roll-up plans. Subsequent to shot day, lagoon contamimtion problems were limited crimarily to high contamination down current frem GZ. . By noon of shot day, it was evident (from the racetrack cloud trackers) that ENITETOK would not be ccntaminated, This was confirmed at 190M (shot | day) by a report from the Radeafe alert system at ENIDETOK, indicating FRED,