sycts thas all local carly falletut\passed between the fleew and GF;ia advisory was passed st approxinately H minus 6 hours to the Britis
Sampling Unit at KW.JALEIN giving forecast cloud trajectories, forecast local
winds for shot tine, forveast area for Britists Init operations, authority ta

penetrate the Danger ..rea, information to the effect that scramble and ro

instruetions would te issued separately at approximtely H plus 14 hourg}

and a d{rective to file flight plane through the KTAJALSIN Liaison Officer
using the advisory as cuthority for YANKEE filghtes:
It yas recommended that the PC boat supporting the RONGERIK weather

station detachment have all personnel aboard upon completion of the 05090dr

rawin rum and be prepared to depart (in event of fall-out) on a southerly
courses

The OL30U weather/radsafe check being favorable, and no transient shipe.

contacted in Area GREEN, all efforts were devoted toward getting the shot

off on times.

as for the past shots, a final check we made of the latest

BIKINI wind chservations run from the USS CURTISS, the run being available

approximately one-half hour before H=-hour. The fact that the low level. wiads
veered around counter-clockwise with ascending altitude (see hodographs) ms
the primary pre-shot concerns however, it was felt that the only adverse

effects of thease winds would be relatively high intensities on the southers
dalands and a possibility of significant contamination in the area between

the task force fleet and GZ. Since YaNXEE was the last BIXINE shot, the
local contamination aspect was of no consequence. Against the possibility
of contaminating the fleet, the proposed aoves of the fleet to the south (as.
recommended above) were made and considered adequate. In addition, it me

planned as on previous shots, to divert "ilson 3 ta a surwey of the questicg~
able areas. These measures proved adequate.

Transient shipping contacts being favorable, Y.NKEE waa detonated from

a barge in the BIKINI Lagoon off YUROCHI in approximately the same location

aw UNION at O5061L0M, Ifay 1954, and without undue ineddent to the embarked
task foree personnel and ships.

Post-ahot advisories were issued within H

plus 30 minutes to the Chairman, ASC, C/S, USA and CINCPACFLT as on past

shots, indicating tine of detcnation and a general statement of safety of
persomel. The larger ships, relieved of cperational requirements to remin
close-in, turned south to an area 50 NU from GZ.
at approsmately H plus 2 hours, a dense cloud wes reported in such a
position that fall~-cout-would be likely to cecur cn the fleet. ‘‘ilson 3 had
bean diverted to 4 point 20 NM southeast of NaN to define the southern edge
of any cortamination in the area,

Since nc contamination was encountered on

this portion of the "ilson 3 flight, the dense cloud was ascribed to a natura

origine “ilson 3, according to plan, next over-flew NAN and the airstrip
obtaining 500 feet readings over NAN of 2 r/hr and 600 to 850 ar/hr over the
airstrip. “ilson 3 also reported the airstrip considerably ridden with
debris and wash-over. Subsequent ground and low-level surways of these sites
indicated that the Wilson 3 readings were mostly the result of air contamination, supporting a general theory that water surface shots (except very close

in) produse a predominately aerosol-type cloud with relatively Little

O=3

Select target paragraph3