release of this plutonium to the marine environment; this would be in addition to the 1500 Ci already in the lagoon sediment. However, for the worst case in which 10 Ci Pu is added to the Crater below the water level, the local lagoon water plutonium concentration would not increase more than by a factor of two. This could lead to an increased dose of a few mrem per year to a person who obtained all of his food from the local marine environment. "Several alternate disposal schemes, while not significantly influencing the health risk prospects, might be preferable. While it may be inadvisable to change disposal plans at this late date, the reviewers believe you should be aware of the possible advantages of other methods." (Bair, 8/1977.) Alternate disposal schemes discussed included ocean dumping, lagoon dumping and several methods of terrestrial disposal on Yvonne (Runit) island. Following distribution of the Bair Committee recommendations, the issue of ocean dumping versus crater entombment was not again raised. 2.2.2 Funding Responsibility In the first interagency meeting to discuss cleanup of Enewetak, held on 17 August 1972, it was agreed that the source of funding would not be discussed at that meeting. By the end of the 7 September 1972 interagency meeting, the general outline of funding responsibilities had been arranged. It was agreed that AEC would fund the radiological aspects of the 1972 precleanup survey, the conduct of any other radiological survey activity that might be required to understand conditions in the environment as they relate to exposures of people and development of standards, and the conduct of periodic followup radiological surveys that take place after cleanup. If later field and/or laboratory work was to be done by AEC in support of cleanup, AEC should be reimbursed by DOD. DOD would be responsible for funding the engineering portions of the precleanup survey and those monitoring and survey activities that were required to support cleanup operations and to insure safety of personnel involved in cleanup activities. DOD also would fund the later cleanup of both radiological and nonradiological material. DOI would be responsible for funding rehabilitation costs once cleanup was completed. The EPA suggested that if DOD was going to fund the major part of the cleanup, then DOD should prepare the environmental impact statement, and it was so agreed. At this time it was generally believed that the pending radiological survey would provide detailed information sufficient for making cleanup decisions. However, even with the tremendous amount of data gathered during the 1972-73 survey, without which the cleanup could never have been planned, the cleanup required extensive radiological support. This requirement was not readily apparent to the early planners. In 1973, while preparing its budget estimates, DNA requested a cost estimate from the AEC for the establishment of a radiochemistry laboratory at Enewetak. The estimate furnished was $1.5 million and that number remained in DNA's planning from 1973 on. No funds were identified in those plans for the acquisition of other radiological support equipment or for AEC/ERDA field operations. The $1.5 million was included in DNA's $39.9 million request to the Congress. When Congress in July 1976 authorized only $20 million, the Director, DNA, wrote in a letter to ERDA: ", . . it is essential that we either accomplish the radiological monitoring within the estimated costs or that any new or additional funding for those tasks outlined in paragraph 2a(4) of our agreement be borne by ERDA." (Johnson, 1976.) This was in direct conflict with the ERDA-DNA agreement of the previous year wherein it was provided that ERDA would perform radiological support for the cleanup "...with full reimbursement from DNA..." However, the July 1976 letter was not challenged at this time. (AGREE, 1975.) 54