particular solutions include possible radiation doses and cost-benefit comparisons. Based on this orientation, five solutions hereafter referred to as Cases 1 through 5, are selected for detailed discussion. Of these, two-—Cases 1 and 5--are considered to be outside of reasonable limits. Case 1 permits radiological doses greater than the protective guides and Case 5 results in unacceptable ecological damage to the land. The remaining three solutions are considered to illustrate the reasonable means to accomplish the objectives of the program. "Case 3 is considered to be the most responsive to the established goals and is a balance of the human, physical, and cost parameters which must be considered. It is planned to conduct the proposed cleanup, resettlement, and rehabilitation project as outlined by Case 3. The estimated radiological dose is well below the radiation protection guides recommended by the AEC Task Group; all physical hazards resulting from past construction and testing will be removed and the cost is well below the mid point between other viable solutions. "Under the conditions of Case 3, the Enjebi People could not expect to return to their ancestral residence island of Enjebi at an early time. This would require both the Enjebi and the Enewetak People to live on land formerly owned and oceupied by only the Enewetak People. Thus, until natural decay processes reduce the exposure rates on the northern islands, there would be less land available for agriculture and some supplement to the people's diet may be needed. The people will be subjected to acceptable low levels of ionizing radiation with a relatively low risk." (EIS, 1975) Case 2 was dropped from consideration because it did not provide a plan eventually result in the people being able to use the northern islands. Case further because the uncertainty in the effectiveness of the corrective actions exposures within the AEC guidelines were so great that the gamble was not p.6-l. of action that would 4 was not considered proposed to bring the justified. (EIS, 1975, Since the cleanup project was to be conducted in accordance with the Case 3 objectives, details for only that ease are reproduced in Figure 2-3, The EIS was published in five volumes. Volume! contains a brief history of Enewetak Atoll and its people, followed by discussion of cleanup and habitation alternatives, then detail of the environmental impacts. Volumes II and IIA reproduce a variety of source documents pertaining to the proposed cleanup project. Volume III presents a summary of the EIS in both Marshallese and English. Volume IV contains comments on the DEIS from interested parties and replies thereto. 2.1.9 Work Toward Project Approval With the filing of the EIS in April 1975, one major hurdle remained before the cleanup project could start; congressional authorization. The DNA provided cleanup plans, testimony and supporting witnesses to House and Senate subcommitteesin the late spring of 1975. The Senate Armed Services Committee agreed to a one-time authorization of $20 million but recognized that the lowest estimate presented was $25 million. The following paragraph, of interest to ERDA/DOE, was included in the authorizing legislation: "The Committee agreed to a one time authorization of $20 million to accomplish the cleanup. The Department is charged to accomplish the cleanup within that amount using every possible economy measure. The committee insists that radiation standards established by the Energy Research and Development Agency be met before any resettlement is accomplished. Although the moral obligation to permit the Enewetak people to return to their atoll was a major consideration, the Committee's decision was based primarily on the premise that the United States cannot walk away from a testing program that cost several billion dollars without making a responsible effort to restore the atoll to the degree that it can be made habitable." (SR 94-157, 1975.) AT