particular solutions include possible radiation doses and cost-benefit comparisons. Based
on this orientation, five solutions hereafter referred to as Cases 1 through 5, are selected
for detailed discussion. Of these, two-—Cases 1 and 5--are considered to be outside of
reasonable limits. Case 1 permits radiological doses greater than the protective guides
and Case 5 results in unacceptable ecological damage to the land. The remaining three
solutions are considered to illustrate the reasonable means to accomplish the objectives
of the program.
"Case 3 is considered to be the most responsive to the established goals and is a balance
of the human, physical, and cost parameters which must be considered.
It is planned to
conduct the proposed cleanup, resettlement, and rehabilitation project as outlined by
Case 3. The estimated radiological dose is well below the radiation protection guides
recommended by the AEC Task Group; all physical hazards resulting from past
construction and testing will be removed and the cost is well below the mid point
between other viable solutions.
"Under the conditions of Case 3, the Enjebi People could not expect to return to their
ancestral residence island of Enjebi at an early time. This would require both the Enjebi
and the Enewetak People to live on land formerly owned and oceupied by only the
Enewetak People. Thus, until natural decay processes reduce the exposure rates on the
northern islands, there would be less land available for agriculture and some supplement
to the people's diet may be needed. The people will be subjected to acceptable low levels
of ionizing radiation with a relatively low risk." (EIS, 1975)
Case 2 was dropped from consideration because it did not provide a plan
eventually result in the people being able to use the northern islands. Case
further because the uncertainty in the effectiveness of the corrective actions
exposures within the AEC guidelines were so great that the gamble was not
p.6-l.
of action that would
4 was not considered
proposed to bring the
justified. (EIS, 1975,
Since the cleanup project was to be conducted in accordance with the Case 3 objectives, details for
only that ease are reproduced in Figure 2-3,
The EIS was published in five volumes. Volume! contains a brief history of Enewetak Atoll and its
people, followed by discussion of cleanup and habitation alternatives, then detail of the
environmental impacts. Volumes II and IIA reproduce a variety of source documents pertaining to
the proposed cleanup project. Volume III presents a summary of the EIS in both Marshallese and
English. Volume IV contains comments on the DEIS from interested parties and replies thereto.
2.1.9 Work Toward Project Approval
With the filing of the EIS in April 1975, one major hurdle remained before the cleanup project could
start;
congressional authorization.
The DNA provided cleanup plans, testimony and supporting
witnesses to House and Senate subcommitteesin the late spring of 1975. The Senate Armed Services
Committee agreed to a one-time authorization of $20 million but recognized that the lowest
estimate presented was $25 million.
The following paragraph, of interest to ERDA/DOE, was included in the authorizing legislation:
"The Committee agreed to a one time authorization of $20 million to accomplish the
cleanup. The Department is charged to accomplish the cleanup within that amount
using every possible economy measure. The committee insists that radiation standards
established by the Energy Research and Development Agency be met before any
resettlement is accomplished. Although the moral obligation to permit the Enewetak
people to return to their atoll was a major consideration, the Committee's decision was
based primarily on the premise that the United States cannot walk away from a testing
program that cost several billion dollars without making a responsible effort to restore
the atoll to the degree that it can be made habitable." (SR 94-157, 1975.)
AT