Vis of standard procedures for the handling of routine task group opsr= ations, enabled the headquarters and afloat oormunications centers to carry the rapidly increasing wolume of traffic prior to BRAVO, &e Kasential to CTG 7.3 wae continuous CH contact with all units aflost, including those with a limited nusber of communications personsel ont equinsent, Kormal flest operations did not provide Navy operators with the experience they needed to operate amt contrel euscessfully, high speed O8 cirouite like the Task Group Gi Common, with from 15 to 23 stetions onthe mets Dispersal af task group mits between etolis, which precluied extensive use of visual and voice ‘ commmications, aad a reluctance te wiilise fully joint ship-ehore teletype facilities, resulted in m overload on Of cirouite ehich threatened to break dom effective communications between CTG 7.3 and unite eutside of visual and CMF range. Marked inprovenet in oper stor proficienay as a result of experience on the circuits, combined with strict circuit discipline exercised by net control, pooling of the best qualified operctors on large ships, and imtoctrination of communication officers upon arrival of ekips in the erea, greatly increased the efficiency of Navy Ci circuits, 5. Task Group 7.3 personnel, eccastomed to Navy teletype ant radio telegraph procedures, enocuntered some difficulty in using th, fecilities of other task groups, ani with the jéint teletype procedures prescribed by CJTF SEVEN. Basie differences in service operating prectices, such as the use of predetermined routing and transfer ef traffic from Of to teletype circuits by the Nary, or the use of codress 229 0