326 DASA 2019-2 The reality of a Limited thermonuclear war can easily be visual- ized as follows, Since it is well known that China is now in possession of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the difficult position in which the United States finds itself today in Vietnam, might choose to accomplish a major double purpose for itself by carefully but quickly increasing world tension to fever pitch over an invented but highly advertised imminent attack by the Chinese on U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, Ther, in one way or another, arranging the secret delivery of a serious blow to American military operations in Vietnam by means of a "small" or ''medium- sized" nuclear device, the U.S, would immediately loudJy protest and decry this atrocious, inhuman and unpardonable aggression on the part of the Chinese. Knowing it was most unlikely that the U.S. would attack her, because of the deterrence of her vast strike-back ability, the Soviet Union would have seriously damaged the American war effort in Vietnam, would have caused this country an immense loss of face before all the world, and would have invited us to attack China. She would have presented the United States, by this one simple maneuver, with a grotesque situation and a critically important decision: Should we retaliate? Against whom? China? The Soviet Union? By means of thermonuclear weapous? A "small" one—on Peking, ona selected Russian target, on Chinese atomic installations in Sinkiang? Possibly the lecision would be to refrain from nuclear retaliation and to take other steps. We could make other assumptions, that it was the Chinese themselves that did this, for one reason or another, Many variations on this theme can be imagined. But in any case, the important thing is that somebody, not us, exploded a nuclear device in Southeast Asia. It would be, to say the very least, enormously provocative. And even apart from questions of retaliation and escalation we would still have the aftermath of limited nuclear wa., even after this one single thing. AYRES: DORSON: AYRES: That's the kind of thing [ believe in. And so we sight get started, I think tit could happen and, of course, if it does hap- pen, first of all civil defense becomes a very popular idea in the United States. It will be thought of in a totally different way than itis now. TAYLOR: Isn't it probably true of any nuclear explosion killing a lot of peaple anywhere in the world at any time?