ones rate SESSION VI 325 UPTON: I guess the thing that concerns me is that history has shown us again and again that the unexpected does indeed happen; that although we have well-laid plans to alert ourselvesthrough a succession of stages, these are based on the assumption that time will be available to shift gears, soto speak, into high. Is this a re. sonable assumption? , HEMLER: The times that they are considering available now are fairly realistic. DE BOER: Still, if we recall the day President Kennedy was shot, we must remember the period of insecurity that followed. I dare say, noborly had anticipated that eve.it that morning and few had any idea about what the reactions of the new President would be. No one knew precisely what had happened and the question of a plot has not been settled yet. I don't see any point in discussing the pros or cons of a plot here and now, except that it should put us on notice that it dia happen and could happen again. Where I was, ona military installation, it took more than an hour before I heard anything resembling a coordinated effort to stop the tide of fear and instill confidence in the situation, I don't know how it was in Washington, . HEMLER: I was in Korea at the time and we moved to more alert readiness conditions. DE BOER: We sure didn't where Iwas. At least not all officers and civilians on the base were notified to that extent. HEMLER: bases. AYRES: Your particular base may not be one of the strategic I think the best argument we can make now for total un- readiness in the event of an attack is this one, that people, despite having ample warning, may not believe it. DE BOER: AYRES: That is another thing I meant to say. That's a good argument, but that the warning isn't there, I don't believe. TAYLOR: I think there is a much stronger argument. try to sketch this. Let me just The reason ! don't believe that we are likely to get much warning, if any, if bombs start falling on the U.S. cities, is that the circumstances in which we would pet warning would be