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3-2
zation in the following respects.
1.
Task Units were reduced from twelve to six by absorbinz the essem-
bly and documentary photography functions within the mejor task units
and by establishing Arming and Firing as a special staff office instead
of a task unit. Task Units 1 to 4 remained major prozrammatic task
units; Tcosk Unit 5 continued to provide all timing end firing and to do
some experimental work for Task Units 1, 2 and 3; and Task Unit 6 provided the usual RadSafe services,
}
2,
Wie
Additional deputy commanders were provided end-it-+ms intendédthat
no limitations be placed on their. use.
This facilitcted samewh2t in-
dependent operations in two locations, and later three when Johncton
Island was added,
Unfertunately. one of the deputies was made evailable /.
for only two. months; and another was limited as to the n:ture of his
employment by the agency which provided hims
34
On October 1, 1957 Dr. Gaelen L. Felt terminated his employment et
LASL, Mr. Don B. Shuster of the Sandi2 Corporation replaced him as
Commander Task Group 7.1, 4s a result, the Commend Section was repree
sented by each of the five major Task Units, Neither the commander
nor any of the deputies performed any speciel Tesk Group functions for
their parent organizations.
4, During the operational phase Task Unit 7 was added to take care of
the UN shot. Because of the purpose end nature of the shot, the limited
amount of data to be acquired, and the fact that much of the prepara~
tion was outside of the Task Force organization, Task Unit 7 bore little
resemblance to any of the others.
The organization chart of Joint Task Force SEVEN, shown in Figure 3.2,
differed from the Redwing chart by omitting a dotted line called "Scientific
Supervision" from the A&C to the Deputy Commander for Scientific liatters to
Task Groups 7.1 and 7.5,
342.2
Command Relationships.
Cormand relationships were closer to the mil=
itary pattern than they were to those for cperations at the Nevada Test Site,
One important difference fron ‘normal military conmand releztionships was
that the Task Group 7.1 concept of operations anc operation plans stermed
from the Laboratories! and DOD device and weapons prozrams and experimental
_ programs, over the composition and extent of which the Task Group and Task
._
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hace
* dyerdet
Force had little or no control. , Because of this, and because support of the
IN
Task Group 7.1 effort was among the principal functions of the Task Force
gee00
Le RG ‘
and of the other Task Groups, their plans and operations depended in many
7
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