PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL
REMOVE
D
Headquarters was notified by radio.°
Apparently, the message received by tne Task
Force was not clear, and was given no special
nandling. Later, a second, more urgent message
made it apparent that the situation on nongerik
might be serious. The men weretoid to stay
indoers with the windows closed. These precausons. no doubt, accounted for the mildnessof
the radiation burns of the skin that a few men
later developed. The following morning (March
2), Captain L. B. Christensen (USA), a radiological safety officer, sent on the supply plane to
Rongerik, found that the radiation levels were
so high that evacuation was necessary. Unable
to contact the Task Force by radio, he took eight
men to Kwajalein in his plane. The other twenty
men were evacuated that afternoon.
Christensen recommended that planes be sent
to measure radiation levels in the inhabited
atolls and, realizing that Rongelap might have
higher levels than Rongerik, he recommended
that plans be made to evacuate the Rongelap
peopie. About 36 hours post-detonation, planes
measured high levels of radiation on Rongelap
and Utirik, showing that evacuation was neces-
sary. Lower levels were found on Ailuk, an atoll
just south of Utirik, but the Task Force decided
that evacuation of the 400 peopie on thatatoll
was unnecessary. On March 2, the USS Philip:
(DDE 498) was ordered to Rongelap to evacuate
the people, and on March 3, the USS ‘Renshaw - ~
(DDE 488)and the USS Monrde{DDE422) Were.
orderedto Utirik fer the possible evacuationof’
the people there. SeaplaneswithTaskForce’ *
andTrust Territory representativexwere-schea-
uled to meet.theships-at theseislaadss(34% |
What went wrong? In reviewing theevénts°
that occurred soon after the accident, I think
that the state of confusion was responsibie for
the chronology of events that occurred.
Certainly, no ulterior motive is evident. In ret- |
rospect, one does wonder whythe people of
Rongelap had not been evacuated for Operation
Castle, as they had been for Operation
Crossroads. The Commander, Joint Task Force
7, explains:
The natives were not evacuated prior
to the detonation because, on the basis of
information available to us, it was not considered necessary, and nofallout was
expected in the inhabited areas. (B-7)
B. The Lucky Dragon Episode
On March 1, a Japanese vessel, the Fuduru
Maru, (Lucky Dragon), with a crew of 23 men,
was about 80 miles east of Bikini. Thefishermen saw the detonation from their ship in the
early morning, but were unaware of any danger.
Soon a snow-like fallout covered the deck and
stuck to the exposed portions of their bodies.
That evening the crew experienced nausea and
vomiting which lasted for twenty-four hours.
The ship’s captain decided they. should return to
Japan, where they arrived about two weekslater. By this time, skin burns were developing
and the crew was put into hospitals.
The United States later compensated
Japan in the amountof $2,000,000 for the
effects of the fallout on the fishermen.and on
the fishing industry (A-38, B-3, B-9). The
Japanese subsequently undertook several
marine surveys in the Pacific to study the
effects of fallout on oceancurrents and on their
fisbip industry. Theaccident added fuel to the
nts of the anti-nuclear groupsin Japan.
against the US testingprogram; these repercussions later caused problems and disrupted one
medicatsurvey,
-..
.:.
-
The externa! radiation effects:onthe-
fishermen were similar to those in the Rongelap
people. Their absorption of radioactive material
via ingestion was less since their food and
water, except for fresh fish, were in closed containers. No thyroid abnormalities were found
(A-14, 38).
|
C. Evacuation of the Marshailese
*Merni Eisenbud, then Head of the Health and Safety
Laboratory (HASL) of AEC New York Operations Offices,told
toe: The HASL representative on the Estes ( Bresi:n) received
word that the monitoring instrument on Rongenk wentoff-scale
at H ¢ 7 hours. He advised me about this in New York, following
which the task force denied him the use of radiocommunications
for about 30 hours. Thefirst notfication to the AEC/HQS was at
about H + 24 when | told Bugher (Head of the Dinnon of Biology
and Mediane, AEC) about my TWX from Breslin the day before.
There were apparently no messages from CJTFT to DC for at
IO0# 157
' 1. Rongelap
On March 1, there were 64 Marshallese
people on Rongelapisland and 18 others were
fishing and gathering copra at Ailingnae Atoll,
about 18 miles southwest. Based on statements
made by
, the Magistrate of the village, and other sources, I have reconstructed
the events of that fateful day.
.
PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED