The Vice President thought that Sukarno was probably right in believing that a democratic govermment was not the best kind for Indonesia. He said the Communists could probably not be beaten in election campaigns because they were so well organized, and were able to play upon the ignorance of the people. In his view, the United States should work through the Indonesian military organization to mobilize opposition to Commmiam. Admiral Radford agreed that there was a good chance of working successfully with the Indonesian military. The President asked what military strength Sukarno controlled. Mr. Dulles said he controlled the Indonesian military strength in Java. Mr. Dulles added that the Indonesian officers were competent, mostly Moslem, and Dutch-trained. Admiral Radford said some Indonesian officers had been trained in the United States. He then suggested that the Departments of State and Defense make a prompt survey of the situation in Indonesia, in order to be prepared for fast action if necessary. Secretary Herter asked that a representative of ICA be included in this group. The National Security Council: Agreed that a group composed of representatives of the Departments of State (Chairman) and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency (and the International Cooperation Administration for economic aid matters), should prepare, not later than &- ig + eet y REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY * eo September 1, 1957, a report for Council consideration on: The implications for U. 8. security of recent developments in Indonesia, especially Commmist political gains in Java. Possible actions which the United States might take with respect to the situation in Indonesia pursuant DO ~ , . £° BOR-SECRET SHme dae HE!