7. to detect weapons detonated at these greater heights. By 1958, he oaid, tt probably will be possible to detonate nuclear weap~ ons at heights of 200,000 to 250,000 feet, thus affording 4 more comprehensive test of U.S. long-range detection eapabilities Mr. Vance remarked that since ea cingle high altitude shot carrted out in 1957 would be inconclusive eoncermming the U.S. ability to detect shots higher than 100,000 foot, the U.S. posltion ln any negotiations for weacons test limitation might be weukened rather than serenetnened. Ability to detect shots at 100,000 feet, he gaid, mixrt convinec many seople that weapons tests at even higher alititumes cold alos be Aetected accurately, Mr. Plelds observed that confuectine wenpons tests both in Nevada and in tho Pacifle @urine 1957 migut nave an unfavorable rerction on wovld public opinion since it could be interpreted as en indication that the U.S. is intensifying its weapons development program, (AOE settable - ne ~ Mr. Strauss then suggested that General Starbird obtain from the DOP a definite statement concerning the present . capabilitics fov high altitude nuclear weapons testing and a state wok about the carliest date on which a weapon might be testcd at altitudes which would provide a more comprehensive evaluation of U.S, detection eapabilities. In response to a question by Mr. Strauss, General Svarbird said he could obtain this information within a week. Commissioners agreed to defer After further giscussion, the decision whether to conduct 4 high alvituce weapons test during 1957 until after General Starbint obt-dned additional information frow the DOD,