ne secaht, “rat their reported fallout should pose no significant hazard. This re- s3uring message was not actually sent from the ship until 0500 the folowing day. A copy of the Rongerik message to JTF 7 was delivered to the CTG 7.4 NREP on Enewetak slightly later in the evening. superior, the Commander, Test Services Unit, He conferred with his after which a message was sent to Rongerik ordering the cessation of all operations and the placeant of all personnel in metal buildings. A layout of the island instal-~ ations and a photograph of the stations at Rongerik, showing one of the satal buildings there, are shown in Figures 63 and 64. sent just after 2400 on 2 March This message was (Reference 84). The TG 7.4 officers wanted more information on the situation on Ronsearik. They decided that the most expedient way to obtain it was to send a radsafe advisor to Rongerik aboard a regularly scheduled resupply flight trom Kwajalein the following morning. The advisor was sent from Enewetak =O Kwajalein on an 0300 Military Air Transport Service (MATS) flight to catch the resupply flight. During the night, Enewetak Atoll experienced fallout that reached a maximum of 0.010 to 0.015 R/hr. It had commenced as early as 1745 in rain at Parry and Enewetak islands with 0.003 to 0.004 R/hr. REENTRY TO BIKINI The position of the fleet 24 hours after the shot is shown in Figure 65. The Belle Grove reentered Bikini Lagoon on 2 March. The three barges, ten LCUs, and ten LCMs that had been left in the lagoon off Eneu were heavily contaminated by fallout of the previous day. H+12 were "several roentgens per hour" Intensities at (Reference 80). Decontamination of these small craft consisted of a primary washdown with high-pressure firehoses, followed by additional hosing and scrubbing by decontamination personnel who were able to safely board the craft after the primary hosing. The Gypsy was quite effective in working close to the 221