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Mr. Stans inquired of Mr. Alien Dulles how many of our
American population could be protected by some of the same sort of
measures, such as subways, which the intelligence estimate cited
as being part of the Soviet program. There was no answer to this
|
question.
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an estimate on the subject by the
Director of Central Intelligence, prepared pursuant to
NSC Action No. 1642-f and transmitted by the reference
memorandum of March 14, 1958.
3.
’
SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY
The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that he
would first go over briefly the strategic developments in Indonesia
over the last week. ‘These were hard to evaluate. Our intelligence
sources deseribe the events as something like a chess game. It was
in any event a strange kind of war. After Mr. Allen Dulles had
dealt with the situation at Medan and at Pakanbaru, Secretary Dulles
inquired whether there wes any solid evidence that fighting was continuing in the Meden area. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there hed
apparently been little contact fighting on the ground, and that such
losses as the dissidents had sustained had been occasioned by straf-
mi
ing from the air.
Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that there had been no change
in the situation on the southwest coast, which was still held firmly
by the dissidents, with no attempt yet at a landing by Djekarta
forces. In South Sumatra, Colonel Barlian, the commander, was
stil. proclaiming his neutrality.
'
Mr. Dulles felt that he might
have gone over to the rebels if they could have held Medan after
they captured it.
Turning to the Celebes, Mr. Dulles indicated
that the northern areas were still strongly held by the dissidents
under Lt. Col. Samual.
The President inquired whether any portion of Borneo had
been affected by the civil war. Mr. Dulles replied in the negative,
and stated that the Djakarta forces still held Borneo,
although they
held it somewhat thinly. He then went on to point out that in recent days the dissident leaders had become very belligerent in their
public statements, despite their difficult military situation. These
statements did not, of course, help in realizing the possibility of a
negotiated peace. Nor was there very much evidence of real fighting.
Very poor communications facilities made it difficult for the dissidents to fount and sustain a concerted military operation.
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