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March 21, 1958

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 359th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 20, 1958

EYES ONLY

Present at the 359th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Items 1-4); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (participating in Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Karl G. Harr, Jr., Department of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Paul McGrath, Charles Shafer, and Robert Stokley, Federal Civil Defense Administration (for Item 1); Dr. Gordon Dunning, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. MEASURES TO CARRY OUT THE CONCEPT OF SHELTER

(NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee", dated January 22, 1958; NSC 5807)

In briefing the Council, General Cutler indicated that the problem of providing shelter for the population against radioactive fallout would be considered at two successive meetings of the Council. At the first one, today, the Council would hear a factual presentation by the Federal Civil Defense Administration on radioactive fallout and on the types of protective measures against it. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.) Upon the conclusion of his briefing, General Cutler called on Governor Hoegh, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, who in turn indicated that the presentation would be given by Dr. Paul McGrath of FCDA.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(d)  
Agency Case NSC F 89-269  
NLC Case 80-434#6  
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Upon the conclusion of Dr. McGrath's presentation, General Cutler complimented him on the high quality of his report, and advised the Council that the purpose in hearing this factual presentation was to remind members of the Council of the basic facts relating to shelter prior to Council consideration next week of the report of the Interdepartmental Committee entitled "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter" (NSC 5807).

The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization inquired of Dr. McGrath the number of casualties estimated in Dr. McGrath's discussion of Operation Sentinel. Dr. McGrath replied that the casualties were estimated at about 82 million.

Mr. Stans, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, pointing out the arbitrary level of tolerance of radiation which Dr. McGrath had set at 75 Roentgens, inquired what was the general range of tolerance in human beings. Dr. McGrath explained that the figure of 75 Roentgens had been selected because this intake of radiation would not make many people sick and accordingly unfit to work. A dose of 200 Roentgens, on the other hand, would cause disabling sickness.

Admiral Strauss commented that the natives on some of the islands in our Pacific proving grounds, and some of our own U. S. personnel there, had undergone much larger doses than 75 Roentgens without serious ill effect.

The President inquired how one could distinguish the degree of contamination from radioactive fallout in a given area at a given time. Mr. Shafer, of the FCDA, explained that it was proposed to distribute instruments for this purpose immediately after a nuclear detonation.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, concurred in generally by the Atomic Energy Commission, on the hazards of radioactive fallout and on the relative effectiveness of types of protective shelter.

2. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION  
(NSC Action No. 1842-f; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 14, 1958)

Having done a lot of hard work on this intelligence estimate, the intelligence community, explained Mr. Allen Dulles, was still of the opinion that the Soviet Union did have a program of civil defense and of air-raid shelter construction. It was not easy to pin down and describe this program, but Mr. Dulles said that he would be glad to invite skeptics into his office to see the enormous

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mass of evidence of the existence of such a program in the Soviet Union. Incidentally, he added, the present estimate had been concurred in by all of the agencies of the intelligence community.

Mr. Dulles then went on to cite certain specific evidence

Weighing all the evidence, Mr. Dulles then summarized his conclusions. First, that a minimum of from 10 to 15 million people of the Soviet Union's urban population are now afforded some degree of protection, and that the effort to provide more is a continuing effort in the Soviet Union. All this was true despite much uncertainty as to the precise character and size of the Soviet program.

When the Director of Central Intelligence had concluded his remarks, General Cutler informed the Council that when it was produced before the Planning Board, this estimate on the Soviet program had been received with a certain amount of skepticism, particularly in view of two sentences--one in paragraph 2, reading "It is impossible to determine the precise state of readiness in the USSR", and secondly, the first sentence of paragraph 11, reading "The adequacy of protection afforded by the shelter program outlined in the above paragraphs has not been analyzed in this report." General Cutler also pointed out that Ambassador Thompson was of the opinion that no shelters were being provided in the enormous Lenin Hills housing development in Moscow. Mr. Dulles replied that he was inclined to disagree with Ambassador Thompson's interpretation of what had been observed in the Lenin Hills development.

General Cutler said that in any case Mr. Dulles presumably agreed with his advice to Mr. Dulles that he should not go out too far on a limb with respect to this estimate of the Soviet program. Mr. Dulles indicated that he had been inclined to go along with this view when it had first been expressed to him by General Cutler, but that he had somewhat changed his mind after seeing more of the concrete evidence to support the existence of a Soviet civil defense and air-raid shelter program. General Cutler inquired whether Mr. Dulles proposed to continue his efforts to discover the size and character of the Soviet program, and he received an affirmative answer.

Mr. Gordon Gray questioned whether it was meaningful to cite as evidence of a modern Soviet program shelter structures which had been built as early as 1949. To Mr. Gray, such structures would have little or no use in a future nuclear war. Dr. Killian, however, pointed out that such structures might still prove helpful as shelter against radioactive fallout as opposed to blast or thermal effects. Secretary Dulles agreed with this opinion, but pointed out that this was not the type of shelter which the United States was contemplating in its current study of shelter programs.

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Mr. Stans inquired of Mr. Allen Dulles how many of our American population could be protected by some of the same sort of measures, such as subways, which the intelligence estimate cited as being part of the Soviet program. There was no answer to this question.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an estimate on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1842-F and transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 14, 1958.

3. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY


The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that he would first go over briefly the strategic developments in Indonesia over the last week. These were hard to evaluate. Our intelligence sources describe the events as something like a chess game. It was in any event a strange kind of war. After Mr. Allen Dulles had dealt with the situation at Medan and at Pekanbaru, Secretary Dulles inquired whether there was any solid evidence that fighting was continuing in the Medan area. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there had apparently been little contact fighting on the ground, and that such losses as the dissidents had sustained had been occasioned by strafing from the air.

Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that there had been no change in the situation on the southwest coast, which was still held firmly by the dissidents, with no attempt yet at a landing by Djakarta forces. In South Sumatra, Colonel Barlian, the commander, was still proclaiming his neutrality. Mr. Dulles felt that he might have gone over to the rebels if they could have held Medan after they captured it. Turning to the Celebes, Mr. Dulles indicated that the northern areas were still strongly held by the dissidents under Lt. Col. Samual.

The President inquired whether any portion of Borneo had been affected by the civil war. Mr. Dulles replied in the negative, and stated that the Djakarta forces still held Borneo, although they held it somewhat thinly. He then went on to point out that in recent days the dissident leaders had become very belligerent in their public statements, despite their difficult military situation. These statements did not, of course, help in realizing the possibility of a negotiated peace. Nor was there very much evidence of real fighting. Very poor communications facilities made it difficult for the dissidents to mount and sustain a concerted military operation.


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The President inquired about the character of the terrain in the area where the fighting was occurring, and asked Mr. Dulles to provide a brief report on this subject at the next Council meeting.



Mr. Dulles concluded his comments on Indonesia by indicating that the Soviets have already delivered to Djakarta ten small merchant vessels. Moreover, Djakarta expects from Prague early in April IL-28 light bombers and MIG-15 and -17 fighter aircraft. The crews to man these planes were already being trained in Egypt and Czechoslovakia. Receipt of these aircraft, together with trained crews, could produce a serious change in the military balance in the near future.

Mr. Dulles stated that the situation in the Near East was a little quieter than when he last reported.



Turning to the situation in France, Mr. Dulles indicated that for the first time most of the intelligence personnel who follow French affairs carefully had come to feel that there is a distinct possibility that General de Gaulle might come back. The General's health was reported much improved, and there were no Paris politicians available to replace Gaillard with any prospect of success.

Secretary Dulles commented that it looked as though Under Secretary Murphy, and Beeley, his British counterpart, had worked out the basis of a temporary solution between Gaillard and Bourguiba. However, it also looked as though Gaillard did not have the parliamentary strength to put this solution through. If he tried to do so, this would be the signal for his overthrow in the Chamber. Murphy had done a wonderful job, and the situation was tragic.

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## The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situations in Indonesia, the Middle East, and France.
- b. Noted the President's request that the Director of Central Intelligence include in his oral briefing at the next Council meeting a short discussion of the topography of Sumatra.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate implementation.

4. ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION  
(NIE 100-58)

General Cutler briefed the Council on the relationship between the new estimate of the world situation and the problem of revising our basic national security policy, on which task the NSC Planning Board was already engaged. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)

After pointing out the difficulty of preparing such an estimate, which required the contributions of the entire intelligence community, Mr. Allen Dulles read a summary of what he considered the most significant changes between the present estimate and the "Estimate of the World Situation" made last year. In the meantime, General Cutler had distributed a statement entitled "Important Points in the Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100-58)", which had been selected by the NSC Planning Board. (A copy of this statement is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)

When Mr. Allen Dulles had finished his summary, General Cutler explained that the statement he had just distributed represented an independent effort by the Planning Board to focus the Council's attention on four or five major points in this very disturbing estimate of the world situation. There was not any difference, essentially, between what Mr. Dulles had just said that the points which the Planning Board had singled out. It was the hope of the Planning Board, through this device, to obtain some expression of opinion from the Council by way of guidance in the current review of our basic national security policy.

General Cutler then summarized briefly the material in the written Planning Board statement contained under the heading "Soviet Strength and Intentions" and under the heading "The State

of Mutual Deterrence and Deterioration in the Western Position". General Cutler said it was the latter development which he personally found to be the most disturbing in the entire estimate. The estimate's conclusions under this heading made many of the Planning Board wonder what new long-range change, if any, we could find as a means of dealing with the situation. Should the United States, asked General Cutler, in the face of the estimate's conclusions on mutual deterrence and the deterioration of the Western position, continue our existing national strategy? Or should the United States proceed to exert greater pressures on the Soviet Union? Or, finally, should we seek an accommodation with the Soviets by offering them concessions? General Cutler said he thought it would be valuable if the Secretary of State would comment on the first two points--to-wit, "Soviet Strength and Intentions" and "The State of Mutual Deterrence and Deterioration in the Western Position". The other points in the written statement had been sufficiently covered by Mr. Allen Dulles, in particular the serious problem created by the capability of the USSR to direct its economic strength in support of any internal-external policy which it believed would help it achieve world leadership.

In response to General Cutler's invitation, Secretary Dulles said that he did have one or two observations to make on this estimate. In the first place, the estimate paid far too much attention to our U. S. problems than it did to the problems which confronted the Soviet Union. Doubtless if the Soviets had written a similar estimate, they would have emphasized their own problems more than the problems which faced the United States.

Secondly, said Secretary Dulles, there was another fact which must be constantly borne in mind. It was true that the USSR had now achieved greater influence in the world than it possessed eight or ten years ago. This is primarily due to the fact that the behavior of the Soviet Union was better now than it had been then. In its attempts to control the destinies of other countries, it is much more sophisticated and subtle. The Soviet Union no longer dares try to reduce other countries to its control by direct and forceful action, but feels obliged to use more subtle approaches. Not only can we not prevent this improvement in the behavior of the Soviet Union, it was a question whether we wanted to prevent this improvement. Doubtless the ultimate intentions of the Soviets were still bad, but their behavior, at least, was better, and ultimately the Soviets may become more civilized.

There was yet another serious problem, said Secretary Dulles, which had not been stressed in this intelligence estimate but which he had been aware of and most recently in his trip to the Far East. In scanning English-language publications in Far Eastern cities, the basic fact had struck him that nothing in the way of news comes out of the USSR except what the Soviets want to

have come out. On the other hand, hardly any news comes out of the United States that we really want to come out. Nothing more contributes to increasing the influence of the USSR and lessening the influence of the United States than this fact. Bellicose statements by U. S. Congressmen and all kinds of sensational stuff which essentially misrepresents the United States is headline news in these newspapers and journals. It was a question as to how long we could stand this contrast with the news emanating from the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles confessed that he did not know how to deal effectively with this problem.

When Secretary Dulles had completed his remarks, General Cutler expressed himself as being comforted by the first two observations which Secretary Dulles had made; but he asked Secretary Dulles then to speak of the problem of mutual deterrence and the potentially disruptive forces which the state of mutual deterrence has stimulated within the Western alliance. What are we going to do about the fear of our allies that the United States will not use its nuclear retaliatory capability to protect these allies from Soviet aggression?

Secretary Dulles said he could not understand what so concerned General Cutler, inasmuch as we proposed, of course, to protect our allies by invoking our retaliatory capability in the event that their vital interests are threatened. Furthermore, continued Secretary Dulles, he did not share the view that our allies were losing faith in our will to make use of our nuclear retaliatory capability in the event of Soviet attack.

General Cutler said that the issue still seemed somewhat doubtful to him. Secretary Dulles replied that if it did, General Cutler must be aware that our allies would soon have their own nuclear weapons. Moreover, mutual deterrence would not only apply to large wars but, to some degree at least, it would also apply to little wars. Did General Cutler object to this situation? What was wrong with mutual deterrence? Did General Cutler advocate war?

General Cutler replied that he was simply suggesting that once the Russians fully realize the existence of the state of mutual deterrence, they would nibble their way into the fabric of the Free World by small aggressions. Secretary Dulles disagreed with General Cutler's view, and thought the Soviets were no more likely to take such risks than was the United States. In strong support of Secretary Dulles' view, the President cited our ties to Formosa and the effect of the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. General Cutler, however, stuck to his point of view in the argument, and added that of course we did not have conventional forces available to meet the conventional forces which the Soviet bloc could use against us in limited war.

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Mr. Allen Dulles thought that Soviet aggression through recourse to limited wars presented the United States with much less of a problem than was presented by developments such as those in Indonesia, which the Soviets could effectively exploit to weaken the Free World. Secretary Dulles commented that in the three situations which most greatly concern the United States today--namely, Indonesia, North Africa, and the Middle East--the directing forces were not Communist, but primarily forces favorable personally to a Sukarno, a Nasser, or the like. Developments in these areas had not been initiated by Soviet plots.

General Cutler replied that, in short, the Soviets were not obliged to do the work themselves; it was being done for them. The President took vigorous exception to this interpretation by General Cutler, and in turn, Secretary Dulles insisted that the Soviets would not dare today to repeat again what they had done in Czechoslovakia. If they did so, the facade of respectability which they had so assiduously built up would collapse. Mr. Allen Dulles expressed disagreement with this view of the Secretary of State. He said he felt that the Secretary's argument might apply to what the Soviets would not dare to do in Berlin, but he felt obliged to point out that the Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia had not involved any Soviet troops. Secretary Dulles agreed that this was so, but insisted that in general the Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia had been the result of heavy Soviet pressure and of fear of Soviet power. The President expressed hearty agreement with this diagnosis, and said that he could speak from personal experience that fear of Soviet Communism was what had induced the democratic leaders of Czechoslovakia to cave in before the demands of local Communists.

Against Secretary Dulles' argument that the Soviets would now no longer dare to repeat what they had done in Czechoslovakia for fear of losing face in the world, Mr. Allen Dulles cited the case of Hungary. Secretary Dulles replied that this was somewhat different, because in the case of Hungary the Soviets were not seizing territory which they had never controlled, but were rather holding on to something that they had previously had under their control.

Secretary McElroy intervened to state that his really great concern related to the question as to whether in a democracy like the United States we could successfully engage in real economic competition with the USSR, expend the necessary resources to do this, and still be assured of popular and Congressional support. Secretary McElroy felt that this kind of all-out contest with the Soviet Union was much more likely in the future than was general war. The President commented that he couldn't agree more, but there would be very few votes in Congress in support of such competition. Secretary McElroy agreed, and said he wondered whether we were not approaching a time when we will have to do a little packaging of such a program, as we had done in the Marshall Plan, rather than meeting Soviet economic competition in a piecemeal fashion. The President replied

that until recently we had thought that we were making real progress with the Congress in this field because the Democrats had always been strong supporters of the foreign aid program; but they were now turning against it, and the Republicans were the majority supporters of the program. It was pointed out that the South, as it became more heavily industrialized, was turning against foreign aid programs.

Secretary Anderson counselled that the Government should study very carefully certain selected economic projects around the world which gave promise of extraordinary value. As an example he cited study of projects of possible alternative routes to carry Middle Eastern oil to Europe, since the present routes were controlled by forces hostile to the West. Another instance was Africa, where Secretary Anderson believed that development might prove wholly theoretical except in so far as Africa can distribute its exports. It would be profitable for us to study how best this distribution could be made.


The National Security Council:

- a. Noted a National Intelligence Estimate on the subject (NIE 100-58) as summarized at the meeting by the Director of Central Intelligence.
- b. Discussed important points in the subject estimate, on the basis of a statement of such points submitted by the NSC Planning Board and distributed at the meeting.

5. CAPABILITIES OF FORCES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS  
(NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841, 1842 and 1844; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 7, 1958)

In briefing the Council, General Cutler pointed out that last November the Gaither Panel had recommended, *inter alia*, that the U. S. and allied forces for limited military operations be augmented; and that a study be undertaken to develop current doctrine on when and how nuclear weapons could contribute to such limited operations. The Council had agreed that Defense and State should prepare a plan with terms of reference sufficiently broad to include consideration of the entire range of U. S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations. These two departments had submitted their plan, which was now before the Council for consideration.

General Cutler then stated that he had three questions with respect to the proposed plan. He wondered, first of all, whether the scope of the study should include the use of so-called "clean" nuclear weapons. Both Secretary Dulles and General Twining agreed that the study should assume the use of both "clean" and "dirty" weapons.



General Cutler then turned to his third question. He pointed out that many of the items listed under the "Scope of Study" in the plan submitted by State and Defense appeared to involve "national intelligence". Accordingly, it seemed to him desirable that the Director of Central Intelligence be consulted in making the examination of the most likely situations in which limited war could occur. Secretary Dulles, Secretary McElroy and General Twining all agreed on the appropriateness of consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

As the meeting was about to conclude, the Director of Central Intelligence said that he had one more point to bring to the Council's attention. He felt that the situation with which the United States would find itself most likely confronted was not set

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forth in the State-Defense plan for the limited-war study at all. What we needed to study was how we can effectively mobilize our forces and resources to deal with situations such as now confronted us in Indonesia. These were a species of paramilitary situation, a situation short of military aggression by the USSR. To cite another instance, continued Mr. Dulles, how should we react in the Middle East if Nasser in the near future tried to take over Saudi Arabia?

In response to these queries, the President pointed out that the Council had made prior decisions of what to do in these instances in so far as it had been possible to decide in advance what we would do. If a de facto government in Sumatra appealed to us for recognition, we would respond.

General Cutler expressed the opinion that the terms of reference in the plan for the study of limited operations presented by Defense and State were broad enough to include study of the situations and problems raised by the Director of Central Intelligence. The President agreed with General Cutler, and illustrated his earlier argument by pointing out how, prior to our entry into World War II, we had all agreed on the adoption of a war plan which gave clear priority to the Atlantic and to Europe over the Pacific and the Far East. Yet after we entered the war, and throughout the course of the war, the question of a priority for the Atlantic or for the Pacific had been steadily argued among the Services. Such a situation, said the President, illustrates how hard it is to predict our decisions in advance of the fact.

The National Security Council:

Concurred in the plan on the subject developed, pursuant to NSC Actions Nos. 1842-g-(4) and 1844-b, by the Department of Defense with the concurrence of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 7, 1958); subject to the understanding that:

- a. The reference, in paragraphs a and b-(6) under "Scope of Study", to "the use of nuclear weapons" will include study of the use of so-called "clean" nuclear weapons.
- b. The second sentence in paragraph b under "Assumptions" is to be regarded only as a working assumption for the purposes of this study.

- c. In view of the fact that paragraph b under "Scope of Study" involves estimates of "national intelligence", the Director of Central Intelligence will participate as appropriate in the preparation of the study.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

*S. Everett Gleason*

S. EVERETT GLEASON