naa
Walle tse eequisitisingt qaong!, deNo cace, bas becant rather more
of & necess‘ty, th? curtailment of Bikini has, we feel, resulted in @ net loss
eompased with the Rechring situation.
3. fdtuetion
{his sitvation represents a very cerious setebeck inmeascuch es Dikini
could be used at most en a staging arer for Taongi and no loncer as a firing site.
In this circumstance, we would recommend @ re-evaluation of the entire EPG sysien
baged upon ¢. move of the bese facilities away from Enivetok and Parry Islands.
Under the assumptions of this study, however, We vould recommend the folloving
Qistributior:
6,
All shots >1 }f ore schedalec at Tacnzi.
t.
15 semsining shots are echeculed at Enivetok.
fhe reasons for moving shots in the reng> 1 to § MP ere simly that,
being barse shots, they my he moved easily, cné their movereat to Tasugl ree
lieves the echsulinzg problem et Enivetok.
fhe only acventege to he found in Situation 3 is thet certain types
of support nay be seduced below the Redwing level.
&. taoulation of m.jar support requiremcuits (exclusive of 1G 7.5 eupzort)
for the three situnticns Geseribed 46 presented {n Inclosure &.
k Incls:
1.
Chart (fron J-3)
3.
4%,
LSD Echedvler (trea J-3)
Tabulction a7? Majer Support
Recuiremenss (from J-3)}
2. Memo, 36-3365 (from J-6)
COPIED =...
» LANL ke “*
TH,