t COtMENTS AND RECOM ENDATIONS _ _ CONCERNING TASK GROUP SECURITY PROGRAM 1. Adequate information concerning the overall security program was unavailable during the early planning phase of the operation. The scattered location of elements of the Test Services Unit, combined with the confusion during the early phases of organization, created a problem in making distribution of publications and directives. Distribution to the elements was made direct by various headquarters, using different channels. This headquarters had no control or knowledge of what publications had been forwarded to subordinate elements. RECOMMENDATIONS : That all directives and publications concerning Joint Task Force matters be distributed thru provisional channels and not direct to_ participating organizations, 2. Exact security clearance requirements were not known, eithern by position or area. For exampoic, the reou.rcment for three (3) "Q" ~« cleared pilots from the Weather Reconnaissance Element was not received until 2 December 1953. During the operational period this resulted in necessary briefings by TG 7.1, to the aircraft commanders for special missions, being very restrictive due to the lack of proper clearances. Exact clearances required for communications personnel were not known during the planning phase. Originally it was cstablished that thirty seven (37) positions would require "Q" clearances, A position survey upon arrival in the forward arca revealed that only six (6) "Q" clearances were necessary. These clearances were for access to a specific area rather than a job position requircment. As late as 20 January 1954, this hcadquarters was not aware of cxact clearance requirements for the U.S.S,. Estcs and aircraft pilots flying in this arc. ReCOhMMENDATIONS : That exact security clearance requirements be established and desiminated to all units in sufficicnt time to cnable procurement of proper clearances. In the event special missions or requirements are imposed later, special considerations must be givon to the time clomont involved in procuring proper clcoarances, Definite channcls for submission of clearance requests should be cstablished during the planing phase to enable proper monitoring and follow-up of all requests, 3. The sccurity program in the forward arca is considercd vcry good. It is mandatory that personnel be continually reminded of their individual responsibilities conecrning relcase of classificd information. AFWL/HO J/yNei L£