of the feasibility of a “thermonuclear reacticn and that the Unite2d
States would net have any thermenuclear weapons in being nor would
it heve any deliverable thermcnuclear weapons for a considerable
pericd of time, We could not be certain that such information would
not become known. n addition, it is generally assumed that a
successful test of a pretotype in any ficld is not followed by inmediate production. These-facts, plus other methods the Sovicts .
may have of acquiring information on the true state of affairs,
would argue against adoption of such a policy. The Soviet Union
could also take advantage cof such a policy on the part of the. United
Statcs hy claiming that here was additional proof of the aggressive,
warncngcering intentions of the United States. If we couple with
this the fact that the Seviet Union will alse know that United
States capahilitics are not in accord with the public announcement,
the Kremlin may consider this as a proof of United States weakness
at that time and the Kremlin mey therefore take certain acticns to
move into areas or attempt tc achieve other chjectives oricr to a
fuller build-up of the strength of the free world.
_—
fA policy of "pulling cur steck" will in all probability have
an undesirable effect on our fricnds or neutrals ebroad, Our
allies, if they did believe that the United States had acquired a
~
large additicnal increment to its arsenal, might relax their offerts
to build up their individual and collective strength. They ment
also fear that the advent of thermonuclear weapons would make
their
own efforts te build up strength futile and, therefcre, cause thom
to adopt a defcatist attitude. This latter point could be pleyed
up rather strongly, especially among nevtralists, who would have
held before them a picture of the United States as a ccuntry that
willingly or unvillingly is ereating a situation, together with
weapons, wherehy the civilization of the world might be destroyed, If they teo acquired information from other scurces that the United
States has overplayed its achievements in this field, a further
element of confusicn weuld be added and additionzl dcubts as to
_United States intenticns and integrity would arise. The same ccnfusion and disadvantages would alse arise domestically with more
powerful and immediate reactions from the United States oublic,
who would nct understand why the United States Gevernment was ate
tempting to practice deception,
It is therefore concluded that the policy of exaggern‘ting the
sienificance of the forthcoming event is neither desirable nor
feasible.