494 as RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL indicated a need for additional crater investigations to develop a comparison between airblast and crater-related kill/damage probabilities against hard targets. Since the backbone of the empirical data base crater, were those in the Pacific and included Mike, Koa, and Oak Craters a Enewetak, it was important to determine the credibility and relevancy of those craters as a data base. Following a period of technical review, it was decided at DNA in October 1979 that additional crater investigations would be undertaken. Despite the fact that demobilization of the Cleanup force was already underway, the presence of substantial resources on the atoll in support of the cleanup requirement provided an excellent opportunity to conduct theadditional investigations at minimal cost. The concept for the test required the deployment of an overwater/ overland seismic telemetry system to study crater formation, refraction, seeoe awe em ee ee compaction, andprofiles. The technical investigation and the operation of the telemetry system were contracted to Fairfield Industries, Inc. The test direction, operational aspects, and support responsibilities were assigned to Field Command. Dr. Byron Ristvet, of the Test Directorate, Field Command, was assigned as the Technical Director and wasassisted by Captain Robert Couch, USAF, Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, the Deputy Technical Director. With the demobilization effort in an accelerated state, the remoteness of the EASI operational area; i.e., northern islands from Enjebi west and south beyond Bokoluo to the Oak Crater, the safety and well-being of the project personnel were paramount. Potential hazards to the EASI operation were great. Isolation of the EASI team, austere support in the northern islands, limited communications, hazards of operations at the northern and western reefs, adverse weather and the possibility of typhoons, harsh climate, environmental! and health hazards, and other potential dangers emphasized the high-risk nature of the project and mandated detailed planning and coordination with the JTG. Additionally, the difference in risk between operations at the Mike and Koa Craters, near Enjebi, and those at Oak Crater, remotely located on the western reef, prompted an operational decision that initial operations would be conducted at the Mike and Koa Craters and, after experience was gained there, Field Command would decide whether or not any operations at Oak Crater would be attempted.>2 After discussions with the project participants and the JTG, Field Command recommended to DNA that a small base camp beestablished on Enjebi to support the project. Basing on Enjebi would permit more effective operations in terms of time available for the survey and minimize wear and tear on boats, fuel consumption, and interference with final cleanup, demobilization and rehabilitation tasks. The support requirements included: dedicated boat support (LCM-8, two whalers) for