rr U Soil Cleanup Operations _ 389 deferred until ongoing experiments indicated the fission products had reached acceptable levels. This policy had been adopted by the USS. Government, and the people of Enewetak had been so advised by the Director, DNA in 1974,55 All of this, however, was based upon a long series of assumptions— assumptions about concentrations, availability, resuspension, uptake, living patterns, diet, body burden, health effects, etc. What had not been ~ realized was that the real decision as to whatlevels of risk were acceptable could only be made by the dri-Enewetak, not by the U.S. Government. These “‘risk-benefit analyses’’ not only required a clear understanding of the uncertainties in the above assumptions, but also had to recognize that the benefits to the dri-Enewetak from certain resettlement options might offset health risks which arbitrary U.S. Governmentpolicies would view as unacceptable. As the cleanup and rehabilitation project moved toward completion, issues of health effects came undercloser and closer scrutiny. Both the Bramlitt study and the DOE concernsover northern island tree planting acted as catalysts in this process. At the 4 May 1978 decision conference, all organizations—and the representatives for the driFnewetak—generally accepted the fact that northern island residence would not be possible in the immediate future.56 There was a changein the people’s attitude during the next few months. In meetings at Enewetak on |-6 December1978, dri-Enjebi members ofthe Planning Council expressed their desire for Enjebi residence immediately. ~ Their legal counsel, Mr. Mitchell, challenged the fission products standards for residence and coconutplanting as being overly conservative and that they may be quite ill-advised for the actual circumstances of the dri-Enewetak. The DOErepresentative, Mr. Joe Deal, explained that the cleanup criteria were based on Federal radiation protection standards, had been formally approved by AEC/DOE,and were unlikely to be changed. Faced with what he perceived as general nonresponsiveness to a very real and urgent need of the people, Mr. Mitchell advised that he would employ an independent ad hoc team of experts to advise the people on dose assessment and risk so that the people could decide for themselves how to use the northern islands. The DOErepresentative was questioned by the dri-Enewetak regarding v the standards, predicted doses, and risks. They did not understand how DOE could oppose northern planting and resettlement now when soil cleanup had barely begun and no final dose estimate could be made until the cleanup and final radiological survey were completed. Mr. Deal reminded the people that all the calculations and predictions before cleanup began showedthat the people would exceed the Federal standards if they lived on Enjebi. He advised the people that he believed another study, based on more recent data, could be completed by May 1979; and |