346 RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL exceeded 47 pCi/g. The island average was determined to be 20 pcj/ &.The subsurface condition was less than 160 pCi/g averaged over on e-sixteenty hectare.!9 Cleanup of hazardous debris and contaminated soil on Enjebi was anticipated, a large, time-consuming task. One majorfactor wasthe time required for travel by boat between Enjebi and the base camps ana between Enjebi and the disposal site on Runit. To minimize this Problem several of the smaller work forces camped on Enjebi while they Completeg their missions. Early planscalled for the Enjebi cleanup forcesto live;, tent camp on theisland for the 6 monthsthat cleanup effort was EXDecteg to take. A major reason for not implementing these plans wasthat Use of Enjebi for a large base camp would makeit moredifficult to convince the dri-Enjebi that they should not begin living on the island until Strontium and cesium levels decreased. Enjebi soil removal operations also were hampered by two tropic) storms, although to a lesser degree than Boken soil removal and Aomon Crypt operations which began while the Enjebi work was underway, The first of the storms was TyphoonRita. TYPHOONRITA On the afternoon of 16 October 1978, Fleet Weather Central, Guam, issued a warning that a tropical storm which had been growingin the Pacific had reached the typhoon stage and would pass near Enewetak Atoll, A chart of the typhoon’s path is at Figure 7-14. Cleanup operations were suspended the next morningto prepare for Typhoon Rita. Sandbags were placed on roofs, windows were taped, and other preventive measures were initiated based on lessons learned in two previous storms. On 18 October 1978, all visitors were transported on the normal Military Airlift Command channelairlift to Hickam AFB. A commercial tug which was offloadingat Enewetak sortied out of the lagoon with its two barges, seeking safety at sea to the south of the atoll. As in the case ofall tropical storms and typhoons, Rita was tracked continuously by Field Command and HQ DNA, and both echelons kept in continuous touch with the JTG and with Commanderin Chief, Pacific. As Department of Defense (DOD)Project Managerfor the cleanup operation, the Director, DNA was responsible for the evacuation decisions in the case of each tropical storm/typhoon. In this case, he decided not to evacuate theatoll. Several alternatives to protect the atoll population were considered. Since Lojwa Camp was expected to receive the worst weather, most ofthe people there were moved to the main camp on Enewetak (Fred)Island. Over 400 people were evacuated from Lojwa between 0930 and 1300 |