129 Planning and Programming | estimated it required to meet the then-planned | March 1977 D-Day. They would require 6 to 9 months; ie., until 1October 1977, before the i diological laboratory would beoperational. gical cleanup plan radiolo the a The major technical problem in completing radiological concerned criteria for evaluating debris and soil against cleanup requirements. Without adequate criteria, the type of equipment needed for field and laboratory measurements was uncertain, necessary survey procedures could not be developed, and there was no measure for determining and certifying the quality of cleanup. The need for precise criteria for the cleanup project was made even more critical by the planned periodic rotation of personnel throughout thelife of the project. The AEC Task Group had made recommendations on cleanup of both debris and soil, but these recommendations were too general and open to too many interpretations to serve as criteria for those in the field. With respect to debris, the AEC Task Group had recommended that “all radioactive scrap metal and contaminated debris. . .should be removed.’306 This recommendation was modified in the EIS Case 3 cleanup actions to the requirement that ‘‘radioactive scrap be removed from all islands in the atoll.”’ Although this guidance might seem clear-cut at first glance, that was not the case. No material is totally devoid of radioactivity, and clearly not every level of radioactivity is sufficient to warrant disposal of the material containingit. The ERDAradiological advisors to DNA on the Enewetak Cleanup were reluctant to recommendcriteria for use in deciding which débris was radioactive and deserving of disposal and which was not. ERDA had criteria in existence governingthe release of materials for uncontrolled use following use in contaminated areas, but these criteria were not suitable for the Enewetak debris situation. One reason was that much of the Enewetak debris was situated in areas with considerable background radiation, so that definitive measurements could not be made unless the debris were relocated to a low background area. Such a practice would have led to costly, unnecessary debris movement merely to make measurements. Numerous attempts were made to define ‘‘background”’ and situations when debris might qualify for disposal, but none were acceptable. A second reason why ERDA criteria were not suitable was that they only addressed surface contamination. Normally, activated contamination such as that found in much of the Enewetak debris was not encountered in ERDAoperations. During one planning meeting on debris criteria, Mr. Tommy F. McCraw, of ERDA Headquarters, pointed out that ERDA’s reluctance to provide advice stemmed in part from the fact that they had not been successful in negotiating a contamination threshold level with EPA. Healsofelt that, if criteria were more stringent than had been used at Bikini, the Bikinians would not understand. (Likewise, the eee weee