emphasized the awkward U.S. position caused by the Enewetak and Bikinj situations. They were of continuing concern in the Trusteeship Couneji and Security Council of the United Nations. The use of the atoils fo, nuclear testing had appeared to someasan abuseof ourtrusteeshipinthe first place. Twenty years had passed and the United States still had not been able to fulfill its obligation to return the people of Enewetak totheir atoll in safety. The United States, which had introduced the idea of trusteeship to protect underdeveloped nations until they becamesei. sufficient, was under especially keen scrutiny since the TTPI was the only oneof eleven trust territories established by the United Nations which haq not achieved self-sufficiency. A timely appropriation of funds to resolve the Enewetak matter was essential to successful termination of the Trust in 1981 and to the best interests of the United States.2!9 LTG Johnsonalso presented a letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense William D. Clements urging favorable action on the appropriation. Mr. Clementsbelievedit to be in the national interest, in order to avoid a host of political and legal liabilities in the posttrusteeship period, to makethe dri-Enewetak less reliant on financial assistance and to promotea political environment in the Marshall Islands which would support continued use of the Kwajalein Missile Range by the United States.2!! Rear Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., of ASD(ISA), presented a statement supporting the project as a prerequisite to ending the Trusteeship and avoidingpolitical and legal liabilities in the posttrusteeship period.2!2 Mr.Mitchell, the people’s legal counsel, then presented a lengthy statement on their behalf. It chronicled their hardships during the war, their exile to Ujelang Atoll, and the hardships they had suffered there, including crop failures, rats, and starvation. Enewetak was not United States property. It belonged to the dri-Enewetak and had, Mr. Mitchell stated, been taken from them without their consent. The use of Enewetak for nuclear testing had been of immensevalue to the United States, with peacetime as well as wartime applications. The United States had spent over $10.6 billion on nuclear testing at Enewetak Atoll between 1950 and 1959. The cost of restoring the atoll would be insignificant in comparison, whether it was $20 million or $100 million. The real values to be considered were the total cost of the nuclear test program, including restoration of the atoll, and what that program had produced for the in) ey, project and of DNA’s efforts to minimize costs and obtain necegsa funding. He then presented a statement from the Honorable Samuel w Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, whic, A project yet presented. The Committee’s questions were incisive an exhaustive. q LTG Johnson’s opening statement provided a general description of the AHA RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL | - 108