million total cost. A review of the study by H&N and POD op September 1974 revised the cost estimates upward to $57.3 million to coy, crater containment of contaminated scrap and soil, increased cog, of runway repair, replacement soil for Aomon and Enjebi, marine Craft radiological monitoring, and decontamination. They indicated that these costs could be reduced to $42.5 million by elimination ofhelicopte, support, use of foreign labor, use of temporary camps on the outer islands and other means.!74 The escalation was disturbing since DNA had bee, advised by Congressional staff members that more austere cost estimates were required. When DNAso advised the Corps of Engineers,!75 the o BS LL NH RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATQ AROMA 102 revised the scope of work to bring the cost estimate to $43.2 million.17%6 After discussions with DNA, POD submitteda further revised estimateof $39.9 million for cleanup, based upon DNA’s financing runwayrepair and other base camp rehabilitation work with other funds.!77 However,this estimate lacked essential detail, and it was apparent that the contracting. out concept wasin difficulty. Meanwhile, suggestions had been made in the Field Command Enewetak Planning Group that the only feasible means of reducing MILCONcosts drastically enough to meet Congressional guidance was through use of military labor. COL Esser proposed that Army engineer troops be used, while Mr. Thomas Flora suggested use of Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) personnel. On 24 December 1974,Field Command recommended to DNA that troops be used to reduce MILCON costs for the cleanup project!78 and, subsequently began refining the concept. It seemed probable that engineer troops from the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH) would be selected. Since the U.S. Armyhadnot officially been assigned that responsibility, Field Command could not contact that organization directly. The Pacific Support Office of Field Command’s Logistics Directorate, which had been working with PODonthe contracting-out concept, was tasked to work with USASCH on an informal basis to identify probable military personnel and materiel requirements, as well as those USASCH resources which might be available for the project. In late 1974 and early 1975, the Pacific Support Office was augmented by three Armyofficers to assist in planning and initiating the project. They were Colonel Howard B. Thompson, Lieutenant Colonel Paul F. Kavanaugh, and Major William Spicuzza. At a general planning conference in Anaheim, California, on 13-15 January 1975, COL Esser advised the other agencies of Field Command’s intention to study the use of troops to accomplish the Enewetak Atoll cleanup. TIPI and H&N representatives discussed the problems of rehabilitation and resettlementat Bikini Atoll as well as Enewetak matters. Mr. Dennis McBreen, Marshall Islands District Planner, presented the Ujelang Field Trip Report. The dri-Enewetak there had generally accepted ae