Planning and Programming 89 uncertainty of maintaining the controls necessary to reach those reduced bone 5: Same cleanup as Case 3 plus removal of over 700,000 cubic ards of soil from other islands; disposal of contaminated debris and soil ocean dumping, replacement of soil from scraped areas with imported soil; and use of all islands with no restrictions as indicated in the 1973 Master Plan. This case was rejected because of the uncertainty that it would actually reduce exposures and because it was inordinately expensive. 10 The preferred Case 3 combined Cleanup Action I] and Habitation Plan C and permitted reasonable use ofthe entire atoll (Figure 2-5). Not all reviewers agreed with the selection of Case 3 as the optimum case or even that it was an acceptable case. Some AECofficials argued strongly for the cleanup of Enjebi and further study of the Runit cleanup problem. Mostof those involved, however, believed that Case 3 provided a practical basis for cleanup, rehabilitation, and resettlement. LTG Johnson personally presented copies of the DEIS to the Enewetak people and their attorney, Mr. T. R. Mitchell, at a high-level meeting on Enewetak on 7 September 1974. Other attendees included: Mr. StanleyS. Carpenter, Director, Office of Territorial Affairs, DOI; Mr. William Rowe, Deputy Assistant Administrator, EPA; Mr. Peter T. Coleman, Deputy High Commissioner, TTPI, Messrs. Martin Biles, William W. Burr, Jr., and Mahlon E. Gates, of AEC; RADM Swanson, Brigadier General Wesley E. Peel, USA, POD Engineer; Mr. Earl Gilmore, H&N; and Mr. Amata Kabua, then Senator in the Congress of Micronesia and subsequently President of the Marshall Islands. Representatives from the Marshalls District Legislature and the Bikini Atoll Council also participated. Motion pictures and illustrated briefings covering nuclear testing, the Radiological Survey, the Engineering Survey, the Master Plan, and the DEIJS were presented in both English and Marshallese to the over 100 dri-Enewetak who attended.!°7 The Government’s plans were generally well received by the people; however, they had misgivings about some aspects, particularly not being able to live on Enjebi, the plan for onatoll disposal of radiological contamination, and the possibility that Runit might not be cleaned enoughto preclude the need for quarantine.!98 Upon his return to Washington, LTG Johnson was forced to send the people more discouraging news: Congress had again denied funds to begin cleanup in FY 1975 on the grounds that insufficient planning had been completed to permit a firm estimate of overall cost.!09,110 During the conference, it had been agreed that some 50 dri-Enewetak, including the Planning Council, should return to the atoll early and live on Japtan during the cleanup project to consult and advise on cleanup and rehabilitation problems. The early return was contingent on Congress