emphasized the awkward U.S. position caused by the Enewetak and Bikinj
situations. They were of continuing concern in the Trusteeship Couneji
and Security Council of the United Nations. The use of the atoils fo,
nuclear testing had appeared to someasan abuseof ourtrusteeshipinthe
first place. Twenty years had passed and the United States still had not
been able to fulfill its obligation to return the people of Enewetak totheir
atoll in safety. The United States, which had introduced the idea of
trusteeship to protect underdeveloped nations until they becamesei.
sufficient, was under especially keen scrutiny since the TTPI was the only
oneof eleven trust territories established by the United Nations which haq
not achieved self-sufficiency. A timely appropriation of funds to resolve
the Enewetak matter was essential to successful termination of the Trust
in 1981 and to the best interests of the United States.2!9
LTG Johnsonalso presented a letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense
William D. Clements urging favorable action on the appropriation. Mr.
Clementsbelievedit to be in the national interest, in order to avoid a host
of political and legal liabilities in the posttrusteeship period, to makethe
dri-Enewetak less reliant on financial assistance and to promotea political
environment in the Marshall Islands which would support continued use
of the Kwajalein Missile Range by the United States.2!!
Rear Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., of ASD(ISA), presented a
statement supporting the project as a prerequisite to ending the
Trusteeship and avoidingpolitical and legal liabilities in the posttrusteeship
period.2!2
Mr.Mitchell, the people’s legal counsel, then presented a lengthy
statement on their behalf. It chronicled their hardships during the war,
their exile to Ujelang Atoll, and the hardships they had suffered there,
including crop failures, rats, and starvation. Enewetak was not United
States property. It belonged to the dri-Enewetak and had, Mr. Mitchell
stated, been taken from them without their consent. The use of Enewetak
for nuclear testing had been of immensevalue to the United States, with
peacetime as well as wartime applications. The United States had spent
over $10.6 billion on nuclear testing at Enewetak Atoll between 1950 and
1959. The cost of restoring the atoll would be insignificant in comparison,
whether it was $20 million or $100 million. The real values to be
considered were the total cost of the nuclear test program, including
restoration of the atoll, and what that program had produced for the
in)
ey,
project and of DNA’s efforts to minimize costs and obtain necegsa
funding. He then presented a statement from the Honorable Samuel w
Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, whic,
A
project yet presented. The Committee’s questions were incisive an
exhaustive.
q
LTG Johnson’s opening statement provided a general description of the
AHA
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