,,. Paw Four Jo;athan 14eisgall January 21, 1982 to the reproductive mechanism and thus to reduce the ‘ number of cells at risk for malignant transformation. At lower doses, as In the adult group, a greater number of cells would be spared for malignant transformation. The authoris are obviously attempting to obsecure the fact that low-level radiation may Indeed be more dangerous at Bikini than the islanders might cons~der otherwise, and it is skjn to a criminal act-to hide this--—information.from” unsuspecting and unknowle~e.. E9!QE: “If people will again return to live on Bikini Atoll in the future, scientists can again use this instrument (whole body counter) to measure the amount of gama radiation from radioactive atoms in people’s bodies as a result of their living on the atoll.” This is tantamount to admitting that the scientists know in advance that the Blkinians will be ingesting gantna-emitters at Bikini, such as cesium-137 and cobalt-60. E21!212: “The U.S. Government and many other governments approve and follow these recommendations.” The authors, in mentioning the radiation standards of the ICRP, UNSCEAR, IAEA, and the EPA, neglected to mention that these radiation standards, far from being unanimously accepted, are probably the most controversial aspect of present-day radiation physics. The Blkfnians have a right to know that there are many radiation scientists who feel that these radiation standards are extremely lax and that they grossly underestimate the potential hazards associated with radiation exposure. When one roads through this booklet, one gets the definite impression that there is universal Moreover, the Blkinians consensus about radiation standards. have a right to know that researchers such as Gofman, Mancuso, Carl Johnson, et al. have had their Government-funded studies terminated because their findings suggested that the accepted radiation standards underestimated the health risks of radiation exposure. .~---” Page 21-27: The scenarios and accompanying risk estimates on these pages are conservative calculations, i.e., “best-cases” verses “worst-cases.” The Bikinians have a right to know this, especially In light of the history of repeated mistakes by Brookhaven, the DOE, Interior, et al. In the Marshalls. Specifically, the fact that the “unexposed” Rongelapese who returned with the “exposed” islanders In 1957 after Bravo became exposed to residual radiation should be relevant here. In this connection, the Japanese scientists who came to the Marshalls in 1973 reported that the Rongelapese should not have returned in 1957 must be mentioned. Also, the lesson or the catastrophic Biktni return in the 1970s should not be ignored. As an addendum, the authors of the DOE booklet have failed to mention the psychological impact of the weapons tests In