An 8 September TWX from the Chief of DASA to CRL, AFSWC, etc., addresses the high priority that must be given to certain types of effects tests which Bz might include a high yield, high altitude ionospheric and exospheric effects test sometime in the near future and details the need for information on radio frequencies, F layer absorption and blackout, EMP, etc., and directs OAR and Systems Command to study these programs immediately and - to implement the proposed programs as soonas possible with the promise from DASA that the funds will be available. 9 Sept. TWX from Betts to labs, operations offices, ARPA, DASA, and Air oeees Force. Subject is Vela planning in light of weapons testing. Plans to continue Sf) Vela Uniform efforts as resources are available and in conjunction with testing program (without undue interference). The TWX contains details on specific Vela Uniform shots. . Krushchev's reply to the West proposal said a ban on , atmospheric tests only would permit the West to improve their weapons by underground testing relative to the Soviets since the U.S. had been preparing for this. Khrushchev called it a "dishonest deal” and said Russia would not agree. He again brought up France, saying it was "clea r that the results of nuclear tests, held by any NATO power, go into the common imperialist NATO pool." Again, he Stressed a test ban could come only with disarmament. =z 3 (WN 9 September Also, the USSR asked for conclusion of a German peace treaty "so as to arrest in good time the sliding of states into the inferno of a rocket nuclear war.'! 9 September Tsarapkin read Khrushchev's test ban rejection at Geneva and Charles C. Stelle, the acting U.S. repre sentative, spoke on the Soviets' test resumption and supposed justification. Among other things, Stelle noted that the Soviets had threatened on 15 May to resum e tests if France continued and France had since done no testing. He gave his view that the Soviets’ decision to resume explained why they had been so obstructionist in the 1961 negotiations. =