a le A TWX on 7 October from Sandia to Betts addresses the question of planning for a possible operational demonstration of the Niki Zeus system with the nuclear warhead. On 22 September Sandia had been asked a number of questions about the availability and feasibility of flying an reentry body to the proper area as a target for such a test and what the problems and possibiiites would be as far as instrumenting the test doing it in a feasible time scale and whatever cost would be involved. Sandia here answers that there is probably reentry vehicle available that the facilities to launch and position such a vehicle as a target are also available, that no instrumentation would specially be required on the target vehicle and that the Atlas missile could be used if the Air Force agreed to fly the reentry vehicle to the desired location. It is noted that the warhead for the Zeus is not yet developed but it is felt that perhaps a unit could be flyable and usable for such a test by spring of 1962. However, even though the schedule and various other factors make the test feasible the document concludes by saying "test operation as outlined above would provide no information useful to voD and AEC in assessing the true vulnerability of the ICBM reentry body-warhead combination. The acquisition of meaningful vulnerability information would dictate a much more sophisticated experiment, probably involving several additional parasite bodies containing instrumentation." Further it is felt that an experiment such as this that would provide the desired data is very difficult to accomplish and the time scales would be measured in years rather than months. In a letter to Secretary of State Rusk, with a copy to Secretary McNamara, on 7 October, Chairman Seaborg notes the possibility of upcoming resolutions being introduced to the United Nations General Assembly. He stresses and justifies his position through the letter that the President not agree or that the US not agree to any such resolution that would curtail cur pewer to initiate atmospheric testing should it be deemed necessary in the interests of our national security. In particular he stresses that the US be careful not to enter any more uncontrolled moratoria whether they are of limited or unlimited duration and whether or not negotiations are required under any particular moratorium. On the same day, Mr. Seaborg sent the President a letter alluding to the possibility of the UN pressure and detailing some of the problems encountered so far in the underground testing and whereas he says that the purpose of this letter is not to make a recommendation for atmospheric testing at this time, he later says "if you should determine that our test program should be accelerated and increased in scope, atmospheric testing would be a necessary supplement to our current underground program. In a TWX from Betts to the Labs and ALO on 7 October he notes the international pressure which may bring about a moratorium in the not too distant future but reiterates the AEC committment to execute the Nougat program as authorized by the President and requests that three weapon development tests of the SOX1, the S6X1, and the 59 be prepared for air drop events with optimum diagnostics on or before 1 December. He requests the various labs study the possibilities of this, include any other high priority items which they might have and which can be readied within that time frame in the same series and come back to him as soon as possible with any comments they might have about the preparations for such a program of three air drops.