Jil be accelerated but that the LRL events could not be accelerated since they are device limited. Also in regard to Pacific operations it was concluded that two air drops could be accomplished in two weeks and that a short term air drop program with ground based diagnostics could be ready in 2-1/2 to 3 months whereas a continuing program would require 6 to 9 months to be ready. A test of the Nik#® Zeus warhead with the Thor vehicle could be ready in about 6 months from Johnston Island. A decision as to whether support facility activity must await an atmospheric test resumption decision was not resolved. Attachments to the conclusions of this meeting contain a great number of details of the status of the various organizations to meet the different test schedules and test programs in the various areas be they underground or at NTS in the atmosphere. For instance the ''quick and dirty" air drop program requires immediately establishing a USAF priority to obtain the air support establishing the test organization and calling on Kirtland who has two B-52 drop planes available immediately. Lengthy and detailed schedules including device types, sponsor, method of detonation, diagnostic capabilities, etc for the various types of operations are included also as attachments including the NTS underground program, the Pacific operations for the various types of programs; "quick and dirty", short term, and overseas operation; and finally for the Johnston Island program which at this time included only a Niki Zeus system test. Letter of October 2 from Gerald Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, (Atomic Energy) to the Chairman of the AEC, addresses the feasibility of a quick response atmospheric test operation which would be completely airborne. After discussions with Hertford of ALO and General Donnelly of Field Command DASA, Johnson feels it advisable to have the Air Force and DASA and the AEC work together on planning for an air drop operation over the Pacific south of Hawaii using airborne diagnostic equipmont with the feeling that this can be a means of conducting tests which are both urgently needed and can be done very quickly perhaps in a matter of weeks. A memorandum for Chairman Seaborg from Commissioner Robert E. Wilson on 5 October is based in part on a call that Wilson received from Arthur Dean the U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations on October 4th. Dean said that he wanted the commission to know that he had good reason to believe that the Soviets would continue testing in rapid sequence until the later part of November and then would probably make a gesture in the direction of the expected United Nations resolution and agree to halt tests if we would do the same. We would then be under such great pressure from the UN to do likewise that he would urge us to try to get our most crucial tests out of the way before that time if possible. Further, Dean said that the pulse of the UN was such that there was essentially no longer any substantial propaganda value to be gotten out of confining ourselves to underground testing because the neutral nations did not appear particularly concerned with the manner of testing. He emphasized that he felt that it was quite important to do the maximum testing by December though he feit that the attitude of the neutrals was unfair. Wilson stressed that this reinforced his opinion that he had had for awhile that it should be made clear to the President that we could only get an appreciable speed up in our testing by going to atmospheric testing and that he recommended that we urge the President that atmospheric testing be started promptly in view of the fact that we are not getting any real credit for confining our tests to the underground testing.