és
A 15 Dec. message from DASA to the Air
Force and the N avy notes that the
—~
McMillan panel has been studying the
Fishbowl effects program and made a
strong
recommendation for exposing a full scal
e ICBM re-entry vehicle or vehicles
on the™ B
Starfish event to observe missile vuln
erability. The RV would be instrume
nted
to measure neutron heating and x-ra
y effects and would be recoverable.
The RV
Perm
would be rendered inert.
Gf
Here is a 15 Dec. letter from Cen.
Booth to Headquarters Air Force info
He 9 nmbeogee
rming
them of the JTF-8 decision to use the
Thor for Fishbowl. Among the details
of ™ JE
tests to be performed, it is stated
that 3 pods will be deployed from
each missile
for each test and that for the Blue
gill event, a propelled pod should
be provided
on the nose of the missile. DASA
has previously funded for the desi
gn and test
of such a pod with Chrysler as part
of Willow planning.
It is requested that the
Air Force consider this particul
ar design even though it was desi
gned for the
Redstone system.
A.15 Dec. TWX from Foster to Betts contains the planned LRL underground
test program for Dec. 61 through Aug. 62 and includes
shots.
On 15 Dec. Bradbury sent a rather lengthy TWX to Gen. Betts on the subject
of HOD andAEC responsibilities as brought up by the recent DDR&E TWX to
Betts and the question of the so called effects test of the 50 X1Y2 device.
Bradbury makes a strong argument for the misunderstanding DOD seems to have
of just what it is that the AEC has been responsible for in weapons testing
for years and points out that it was the responsibility of the AEC to develop weapons and make appropriate diagnostic*experimental measurements towards this objective and in addition, to provide by calculation or direct
measurement for the using agency the definitive information regarding the
fundamental output of those bombs. This, of course, specifically includes
the spectrum measurements in such areas as x-ray and neutron outputs, which
is often required by the DOD.
He goes into some detail on what he feels is
the proper definition of the weapons effects responsibility which the DOD
does in fact have, and makes the following statements: ‘We believe the
AEC should understand these words to mean the effects which are caused by
the use of nuclear weapons on systems or things of DOD interest, for example
structures, communication, etc. The effects of nuclear weapons on nuclear
weapons are an AEC responsibility as is the determination of the actual
eminations coming out of the detonating nuclear system. The latter should
not be considered to be a "weapon effect.'' It is also important that the
AEC ascertain whatever it canabout the phenomena associated with nuclear
explosions whether of immediate interest to the DOD or not." Dr. Bradbury
also discusses the theoretical role of DASA as a collection and sorting
agency for the various services within the DOD and feels that the AEC should
have no objection to them acting as such but sort of wistfully wishes that
they in fact could act as such instead of having the various contractors
and services come directly to the AEC and the labs in so many cases,
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