Operation Plan CTG 7.3 No. 1-53 hostilities, in view of their inability to aprroach the Operational atolls undetected. There is a possibility that the USSR might attempt the erployment of small surface craft, such as fishing boats, for instrumentation and obser~ vation. There is a more remote possibility that the Seviet might attempt the landing of raiders or saboteurs “rom a small, fast surface craft launched from a larger surface vessel. aAs in the case of submarines, attempted lagoon pene~ tration is possible but unlikely. ec. USSR Air Capabilitics. No information in addition to that set forth in Annex C to CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53. ad. Conclusions. Of the foregoing capabilities, the follewing ere those which it is considered the USSR is most likely to attempt, un‘er present world conditions: (1) Fspicnage, (2)é Unauthorized instrumentaticn by submarine, surface vessel or (3) Observation or photography by submarine or aircraft. (4) Sabotage. aircraft. If it decided to initiate war with the U.S., the Soviet might well attempt overt action (direct attack) by shins or aircraft, or raids, immedietcly precccing or in conjunction with the opening of hestilitics.