rapers, 1953-01
(Ann Whitman file)
wVLsenMmower:
nity Sethe
high or low, but in any event were considered by the Subcomnittee to
be as realistic as any that could be made at this time.General Thomas
noted that the Subcommittee report highlighted a number of deficiencies
including:
(a) lack of concrete information as to the size of the
forces of both the USSR and the U.S. in mid-1960; (b) limitations on
the kind and amount of operational data available concerning new
weapons;
(c) uncertainties as to the extent to which our air defense
measures could be degraded by Soviet electronic countermessures equipment;
(d) the paucity of intelligence concerning Soviet guided missiles
systems, etc.
General Thornes indicated that it was the conclusion of the Sub-
comaittee that in the event of a Soviet attack on the U.S. in 1960,
both the US and the USSR vould be devastated; that by such an attack
the USSR in 1960 could kill from 1/4 to 1/2 of the U.S. population end
injure meny many more in the process; and that the military and civilian
leadership of the U.S. at the Seat of Government would be virtually
wiped out.
Upon the completion of the Subcomaittee's presentation, General
Cutler mentioned that access to the Subcomnittee's report was being
strictly linited in accordance with the President's direction; that
only two coptes thereof yould be made; the President's copy would be
retaiied in the files of the NSC, and that a second copy vould be desigbeted for the 1.SC's Disaster File. He also menticned that access to the
report in any future instance would be decided in eech case by the
President.
Gzneral Cutler then called for questions.
Aémiral Strauss asked that cone of the charts utilized by the Staff
be re-exhibited, ranely the chart dealing with Attack Conditicns
mexbered VI and VITI (Full Alert vs. Strategic Surprise). Acaulrel
trauss observed that the chart seened to indicate that the same awuber
of weepors were placed on target end yet there was a large difference
in the weight thereof yworer the respective attack ccnditions sinuleted.
It was pointed out to AGniral Streuss that the 12% increase in the weight
of the weapons detoneted is st+tritutsble to the fact that in thet perticu-
ler instance (Full Alert) larger aircrert were mounted where the lerger
attack occurred,
thus enabling the Russians to carry larger weapons.
The President referred to thet portion of the presentation dealing
with Full Alert and queried es to the nature of the USSR's calculstions
relative to our taking the offensive if we were to see tremenious robilizaticn occurring in the USSR.
He wondered if the Russiens would dsre
give the Free World such warning lest it be concerned that we would strike
The Fresident said that
Goneral Thorss commented that it vas his own belief thet it ves not
realistic or reasonable to think in terms of sterting war under conditions
of full alert for the opponent.
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REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY
first upon seeing such tremendous mobilisation.
vnile the democracies don't start wars, the Russians might calculate thet
they would in such an eventuality.
cee eT ER