initiate war against the U.S. in mid-1960.
”
.
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Proceeding on that
of its being perpetrated: (a) with no warning (strategic surprise),
and (b) with full warning (full alert) and with U.S. forces on waximum systainable alert.
General Smith thereafter outlined the auxiliary assumptions on
which this year's evaluation was besed. These included, but were
not limited to, the following: USSR would would have adequate bases
from which to launch an attack; they would have adequate refueling
capability; they would be willing to expend some of their aircraft
by assigning them to one-way missions; their nucleer warheads would
be set to detonate on impact if the carrying aircraft were shot down;
some of their submarines would have guided missile capabilities; they
would risk strategic surprise in order to outflank the DEW Line; they
would not engege in large-scale clandestine attack, etc. Insofar as
the U.S. is concerned, General Smith indicated that some of the auxiliary
assumptions included the following: the status of U.S. forces as of the
time of the attack would be the same as those actually in being on
March 1, 1957; a substantial portion of SAC would be in constant alert
status; etc. General Smith then indicated that four hypothetical Soviet
attacks were planned by the Subcommittee: (a) attack based on Strategic
Surprise and aimed only at military targets, (b) an attack besed on
Stretezic Surprise and aimed at composite targets, (c) am attack tesed
cn Full Alert and aimed only at military targets, and (a) an attack
tesed on Pull Alert and aimed at composite targets.
General Saith then called upon Colonel 8S. D. Kelsey, USAF, a menber
of the Subcommittee Siaff, who presented in detail the highlichts of
the USSR's attack on the continental U.S. He wes followed by Captsin
W. R. Stevens, USN, a member of the Subcommittee Staff, who outlined in
scie Cetail the retaliatory attack made on the USSR by SAC. Colonel
Kelsey then gave the results of the country's demecge assessment insofar
as the U.S. was concerned. He was followed by Captain Stevens who sunmsrized the results of the demage inflicted on the USSR.
Dr. L. L. Montague, CIA, a meinber of the Subcommittee Staff, presented the effects of Scviet clandestine operations on the continental
inn
iiiiniiiicigiiss SSR
iuei
nineSSSSE
USS Trin
ESEEOCeT AES TSSLESS SASSO SSS aESES
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clicecccccccceresccccssresere: Dr, Montame was follcwed by Colonel
.
eseeeove
J.D. Raney, USA, a member of the Subcomeittee Staff, who outlined the
military ections resulting from three elternstive conditions of attack
considered by the Subcommittee. Colonel Raney also described the denage
done to the U.S. under each of these attacks. In essence, the conclusion
was crewn that under any of the attack conditicns described by Colonel
Raney, the survival of the U.S. would heng in the belence.
General Thomas concluded the Staff presentation by noting that any
evaluation of net capabilities at a time three years hence wes necessarily speculative.
rainandes
ane
As a consequence, the estimates mede could be either
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assumption, the Subcommittee had war-gamed the attack on the basis
>
REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY ;,/:
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(Ann Whitman file)