liaisonwith the variousagenciesof the Departmentof the Navy includingthe MarineCorps. Becauseof the divergenceof Naval operations end proceduresf-those oftencommonto the Amy and Air Force;a qualifiedJ-1 Navy officerprovedessential. Although additional. staffpersonnelwould have been desirableat later stages of the operation,this smallcompactJ-1 staffassistedby two enldstod stenographers and me civilianstenographer, carriedout the entireJ-1 functionthroughoutOperationSANDSTONE. An organizationchartis attachedas Incl 1. 3. THE PERSCMNELANDADMINISTRATIVEPLAN: a. Foxnmlationof an outld.ne for a Personneland Adminietration Planuas initiatedon 3 October1947. Althoughconsiderable confusionexistedat that early date due to the uncertaintyof the scope, missionand durationof the Joint Task Force,it was nevertheless apparentthat a soundpersonnelend administrative plan for the JTF was vital. Bearinginnind the ob~ectivesmentionedin paragraph1 above,the solutionto a soundplan dependedupon findingthe answers to two main questions: (1) What policieson personnelandadministratlon were necessaryfromthe HeadquartersJoint Task ForceSevenview- point;(2) What methodsshouldbe used to operatethe policies. b. With refomnee to both of the above questionsas previouely mentioned,therewas very littlefor the Asstt Chiefof Staff,J-1, to go on. The personneland administration plan adoptedbytbe Joint Task Forcewas thus in effect‘created. w This plan was publishedas AMOX I to Field Mer #l ear- ~ ~~~r” 3 SectionI