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regarding the introduction of advanced weapons into Korea;
recent Chinese Communist military activities in the AmoyQuemoy area; the cancellation of the Moscow Air Show; re-
cent Soviet propaganda attacks on the United States; devel-
opments in the Soviet missiles program; Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean; and developments in the Middle
East.
3.
U. &. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA
(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated
April 12 and 26, and May 1, 1957; Memo for BSC from Executive
Secretary, subject: "Report to the President on the Vice Presi-~
dent's Visit to Africa”, dated April 22, 1957; NSC Action No.
1707; SNIE 36.5-57; NSC 5716; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject:
June 26, 1957)
"U. S. Policy Toward Libya", dated
Mr. Cutler briefed the Council members on the contents of
NSC 5716 (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).
He was interrupted when he reached paragraph 23, reading as follows:
"23.
Additional U. S. Military Facilities in Libya.
fDecide to construct additional U.S. military installa-
tions in Libya only if they are regarded as an essential
requirement in the light of (a) a general review of our
strategic needs in the Mediterranean area, (b) new weapon developments, (c) the political and economic conditions
of maintaining our present base facilities in the area,
and (d) the over-all cost ceiling on defense expenditures./#*
"* Defense Member and JCS Adviser propose deletion."
Secretary Wilson interrupted Mr. Cutler's remarks to ex-
plain that the Defense Department did not like paragraph 23 for the
reason that if it were put in a policy paper on Libya, it ought to
REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT, D. RISENHOWER LIBRARY
be put in all NSC policy papers dealing with subjects of this nature. In short, it was redundant and unnecessary.
Mr. Cutler replied that in view of our budgetary stringency, it might indeed be desirable to include paragraphs like this
in every NSC paper, and to pay much more attention to such financial
and economic matters in our papers.
To this Secretary Wilson replied
that it was the duty of the National Security Council at its meetings
to decide on the wisdom of courses of action such as that in peragraph 23.
On the other hand, it made no sense to include this materlal in NSC policy papers.
Secretary Wilson then added his own view
that the costs of the program of military assistance to Libya were too
high, and he predicted that we would have to support Libya from now on
out.
We were hooked.
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