

June 27, 1957

MEMORANDUM

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 328th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, June 26, 1957

Present at the 328th NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Under Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, National Science Foundation (for Item 1); the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Special Assistant to the President Cutler; the White House Staff Secretary; Administrative Assistant to the President Harlow; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

- 1. ANTARCTICA
(NSC 5424/1; NSC 5528; NSC Actions Nos. 1500 and 1705; Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, subject: "Interim Report on Antarctica", dated April 26, 1957; Progress Report, dated May 8, 1957, by OCB on NSC 5424/1; NSC 5715; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Antarctica", dated June 21, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the National Security Council very thoroughly on the high points in the draft statement of policy on the subject, and called attention to the map of Antarctica which had been distributed at the beginning of the meeting. (Copies of Mr. Cutler's briefing note and the Antarctica map are filed in the minutes of the meeting.) At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Cutler called on the Secretary of State to speak.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12333, SEC. 1.4 (b)

MR 78-148 #14
BY *llh* DATE 11/14/86

FOR MR. CUTLER
E.O. 12333, SEC. 1.4 (b)
NSC letter 8/18/86
11/14/86


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
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
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On this subject, Secretary Dulles insisted that he could see no necessity for spending any money that we don't want to spend in the future to carry on scientific work in the Antarctic. The point was that we already have a sufficiently good basis for U. S. claims in the Antarctic. Mr. Cutler also pointed out that the Planning Board had contemplated the reduction of U. S. bases in the Antarctic at the end of the International Geophysical Year. The President expressed the view that the United States would probably not need any permanent stations in Antarctica after the termination of the IGY on December 31, 1958. Certainly, as the Secretary of State had said, we wouldn't need very much in the way of permanent stations. Secretary Wilson, however, complained of the expenses that this policy would involve for the Defense Department, particularly in the light of the tight budgetary situation we were now facing. Mr. Brundage expressed the view that it was a very bad time for the United States to stake out claims in Antarctica. Mr. Cutler then quoted paragraph 19 of NSC 5715, to the effect that the United States was not to announce any claims until IGY considerations were no longer a major factor. At that time, after NSC review, the United States would announce the total definitive U. S. claim.



The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5715, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 21, 1957.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5715, subject to the following amendments:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5715, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 21, 1957.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5715, subject to the following amendments:
- (1) Paragraph 13: Delete the asterisk and the footnote relating thereto.
 - (2) Paragraphs 16-19: Delete the asterisks preceding these paragraphs, and the footnotes relating thereto.
 - (3) Paragraph 17: Delete the asterisk at the end of this paragraph, and the footnote relating thereto.
- c. Noted the President's directive that the statement of policy on Antarctica, as amended and approved, be given a limited distribution on a strict need-to-know basis.
- d. Agreed that, in reducing U. S. Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period in accordance with paragraph 23 of NSC 5715, consideration should be given not only to reducing the number of U. S. stations in the area but also to substituting expeditions for permanent stations.

NOTE: NSC 5715, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5715/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence commented briefly on the propaganda reactions from Peiping, Moscow and North Korea, to the U. S. announcement of its intentions to modernize U. S. forces in South Korea.

Mr. Dulles then analyzed the increased Chinese Communist military activity in the Amoy-Quemoy area. In the course of their shelling of the Nationalist-held offshore islands, the Chinese Communists had apparently fired 9350 rounds in a single day recently, the heaviest such bombardment ever recorded and directed against the Quemoy island group.

The President interrupted to ask whether our Government had people on these offshore islands. Mr. Dulles replied that we had a MAAG group, Secretary Dulles, who was obviously very concerned over this increased military activity, complained that he hadn't been able to find that the State Department had had any report from representatives of the Department resident in the area, with respect to the Communist shelling of the offshore islands. Secretary Wilson interrupted to say he would not be in the least surprised if it had been the Nationalists who had initiated these artillery exchanges. Secretary Dulles went on to ask whether we did not get reports on such events, and as to what is going on in the Quemoy area, from representatives of the Department of Defense


Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the view that now that the Chinese Communists had completed their new railroad into Amoy, they wanted to open up the Port of Amoy to shipping. Accordingly, they might wish either to seize or to neutralize the small islands-- Little Quemoy, Tatan and Ehtan--which could block entrance to the Port of Amoy. It was suggested that the absence of official U. S. reports on this stepped-up shelling might indicate that our people in this area regarded the matter as no great departure from the routine artillery exchanges between the Communists and the Nationalists.

Mr. Dulles went on to comment on the movement of a light bomber group of Chinese Communist IL-28s in the direction of the Amoy area. He closed his comments on the general topic of the offshore islands by stating that there existed no real evidence that the Chinese Communists were about to try to seize these offshore islands at the present time. He pointed out, however, that there were plenty of Chinese Communist troops in the general area if a decision to move were made.

Mr. Dulles next said that the Soviets had issued an announcement to the press on June 21 that their big Air Show, scheduled for June 30 in Moscow, would not take place. The event had

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been cancelled on the excuse that bad weather prevailed currently and would be likely to continue over the next few days. Mr. Dulles doubted if this was the real reason for the cancellation, because if bad weather had been the chief factor, the show could have been postponed rather than cancelled. It was possible that there were not sufficient novel types of aircraft to warrant so publicized a show this year.



The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Communist reaction to U. S. announcements

regarding the introduction of advanced weapons into Korea; recent Chinese Communist military activities in the Amoy-Quemoy area; the cancellation of the Moscow Air Show; recent Soviet propaganda attacks on the United States; developments in the Soviet missiles program; Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean; and developments in the Middle East.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 12 and 26, and May 1, 1957; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report to the President on the Vice President's Visit to Africa", dated April 22, 1957; NSC Action No. 1707; SNIE 36.5-57; NSC 5716; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy Toward Libya", dated June 26, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council members on the contents of NSC 5716 (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). He was interrupted when he reached paragraph 23, reading as follows:

"23. Additional U. S. Military Facilities in Libya.
 Decide to construct additional U. S. military installations in Libya only if they are regarded as an essential requirement in the light of (a) a general review of our strategic needs in the Mediterranean area, (b) new weapon developments, (c) the political and economic conditions of maintaining our present base facilities in the area, and (d) the over-all cost ceiling on defense expenditures."/>

"* Defense Member and JCS Adviser propose deletion."

Secretary Wilson interrupted Mr. Cutler's remarks to explain that the Defense Department did not like paragraph 23 for the reason that if it were put in a policy paper on Libya, it ought to be put in all NSC policy papers dealing with subjects of this nature. In short, it was redundant and unnecessary.

Mr. Cutler replied that in view of our budgetary stringency, it might indeed be desirable to include paragraphs like this in every NSC paper, and to pay much more attention to such financial and economic matters in our papers. To this Secretary Wilson replied that it was the duty of the National Security Council at its meetings to decide on the wisdom of courses of action such as that in paragraph 23. On the other hand, it made no sense to include this material in NSC policy papers. Secretary Wilson then added his own view that the costs of the program of military assistance to Libya were too high, and he predicted that we would have to support Libya from now on out. We were hooked.

Mr. Cutler finished his briefing with a discussion of the Financial Appendix to NSC 5716, and then suggested that the Council dispose of the question as to whether or not to include paragraph 23 in the agreed policy paper. Apropos of this matter, he said he had understood that the Air Force had gone to the Bureau of the Budget and had agreed not to go ahead with the construction of additional U. S. military installations in Libya. Secretary Wilson took sharp issue with Mr. Cutler, and said that the decision to forgo further construction had been made in the Department of Defense. Admiral Radford pointed out that the Defense Department was restrained in its expenditures all around the world by budgetary considerations, and he therefore saw no reason for including this paragraph dealing specifically with Libyan construction. It should not be forgotten that the Defense Department, as well as other agencies, was carefully scrutinizing the expenditure of money.

The President said that this might indeed be true, but that there was some evidence to the contrary.

Mr. Cutler suggested a solution of the problem by proposing that the Council agree to delete paragraph 23 of NSC 5716, but have the Record of Actions of the Council meeting indicate that the substance of paragraph 23 had been discussed at this meeting. Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State and other members of the Council if, subject to the above-mentioned amendment, the remainder of the policy report was satisfactory. Secretary Dulles indicated that the remainder of the report was satisfactory, but suggested that Mr. Hollister might wish to comment on it.

Mr. Hollister stated that he merely wanted to point out that in adopting this policy on Libya the Council was moving in the reverse direction from what we always hoped to do. To be more precise, we generally hoped that if we increased police and internal security forces in a country we were assisting, we could achieve commensurate reduction in the force levels of the regular army. We were not doing this in Libya, and that was all that Mr. Hollister wished to point out. Mr. Cutler replied that the paper did indicate that as we built up the Federal Army of Libya we could cut down on the provincial forces, as indicated in paragraph 20-a.

[Redacted section]

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Mr. Brundage inquired whether, if NSC 5716 were adopted, the United States would be obliged to assume all responsibility for the 4500-man Federal Army of Libya. Mr. Cutler replied in the affirmative, and indicated that there was no one else to share in this expense. At least, however, the expenditure was spread out until 1962.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5716, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 26, 1957.
- b. Discussed principles which should govern the construction of additional military installations in Libya, in the light of (1) our strategic needs in the Mediterranean area; (2) new weapons developments; (3) the political and economic conditions of maintaining our present base facilities in the area; (4) the over-all cost ceiling on defense expenditures.
- c. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5716, subject to the deletion of paragraph 23 and the footnote relating thereto.

NOTE: NSC 5716, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5716/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

4. U. S. POLICY TOWARD TURKEY

(NSC 5510/1; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1486 1560, 1624, and 1682; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U. S. Aid Programs", dated December 5, 1956; NSC 5708; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy Toward Turkey", dated March 11 and May 24, 1957; NSC 5708/1)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of NSC 5708/1 (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting), and called special attention to the only paragraph in dispute-- reading as follows:

[Redacted text block]

"* Budget proposes deletion."


He indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the third and fourth sentences of the paragraph, on the ground that these sentences had been put into the policy paper to satisfy a requirement (NSC Action No. 1682) to query General Norstad as to the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey

[Redacted text block]

He then asked Admiral Radford to comment on this suggestion.

Admiral Radford pointed out that he had not been present at the previous Council discussion of the Turkish policy paper, but that Mr. Cutler's suggestion was all right with him. Secretary Wilson shared this view, and pointed out that he did not agree with the

advice that General Norstad had given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford said that it would be very difficult at the present time to initiate any reduction in the NATO-approved Turkish force levels, but he had no objection to leaving in the phrasology suggested by Mr. Cutler. Secretary Wilson expressed great anxiety about the expenses which were being incurred in Turkey and in similar areas by the Department of Defense.



Secretary Wilson expressed agreement with Admiral Radford's position, and the President, looking around at the members of the Council, predicted that some day they would all come to believe him when he said that NSC policy reports acted upon by the National Security Council should not be transmitted in their verbatim form to the subordinates of the members of the Council or to our diplomatic establishments abroad.

After further discussion by Secretary Wilson and other members of the Council, Mr. Cutler suggested that including the portions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete, should remain in the policy paper. The President agreed to this suggestion, and made inquiry as to the size and character of over-all U. S. assistance to Turkey. He said he wished the relevant facts in the case in order to write a personal letter to General Norstad. In the ensuing discussion, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford pointed out with emphasis that despite the costs, our assistance to Turkey was certainly one of the better bargains for our money. The President said he did not doubt this, but that Turkey, a poor country, could get along better with a smaller and more efficient force. Mr. Cutler requested Admiral Radford to supply him with the facts requested by the President for his use in writing to General Norstad.

It was agreed to delete the final sentence as proposed by the Bureau of the Budget.


The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5708/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1682-b; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including

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their comments on General Norstad's recommendations regarding a possible reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 24, 1957.

- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5708/1, subject to the revision



NOTE: NSC 5708/1, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5708/2 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

- 5. FURTHER APPLICATION OF "NEW LOOK" TO U. S. DEFENSE EFFORTS OVERSEAS
(Draft Memo for the President, same subject, dated June 19, 1957; NSC Action No. 1737)

The National Security Council:

Deferred discussion of the reference draft memorandum on the subject until a later Council meeting.

S. Everett Gleason

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