twin Pearl Harbor or from the United States, as deck space became available. Since deck cargo space was usually at a premium, the shipment of these craft was difficult to arrange. Any project of this magnitude is naturally subject to a multitude of problems connected with the shipment of unusual items. In general, it may be stated that for this particular Project, the use of MSTS shipping facilities presented the most acceptable means of logistic service from the point of view of economy and availability. The highest degree of cooperation was received from the Navy and from MSTS in providing every possible facility which could be made available for this service, The interposition of the Korean War, with its extremely heavy and unanticipated demands on all logistic services, caused unavoidable dis- ruption of schedules and disruption of cargo space availability which could not be foreseen and for which no prior counter-measures could have been taken, The energetic reactivation of cargo type vessels accomplished by the Navy as a result of this unusual demand ultimately provided the space necessary to meet the over-all shipping requirements. During the period in which lack of sufficient cargo vessels was most acute, there was a serious disruption in construction progress because of cancellations, delays, and deferment of needed items. If this con- dition had extended over a longer period of time, it would have been essential that commercial vessels be chartered or that the operational phase be deferred. Upon the activation of the Joint Task Force Three Command, H &N was directed to submit estimates of shipping through SFOO, Los Alamos, six months in advance. These estimates contained predictions of tonnages of general cargo and chilled and frozen cargo to be shipped by surface ships each month and of pounds of cargo to be shipped by MATS aircraft each month. From these estimates, tentative allocations were made by CJTF 3 in Washington. A representative of the J-4 Section of CJTF 3 was stationed in Oakland for the purpose of supervising the actual allocation. The ships designated were not utilized solely for Eniwetok cargo, however, for at times the available capacity was limited or the type of cargo which could be accepted was specified. These limit— ations affected all shipping agencies concerned, each of which found it necessary to accept reductions in their predicted requirement. A close working relationship was maintained between the H & N Oakland represen- tative and CJTF 3 representative. AIR SHIPMENT As previously stated, a complementary and essential facility for the shipment of certain items of cargo was provided by the MATS system. This was particularly effective for the transportation of mail and relatively small items of equipment and material which were urgently required at the Jobsite. The MATS terminal located at Travis Air Force Base, (Fairfield- Suisan) ,California, constituted one terminal of the San Francisco- 4-11