CHAPTER 14.2 MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION The transportation of materials was a major logistic problem be- cause of the isolated location of the Jobsite, the magnitude of the Project, the changes in scope of the work, and the unanticipated diversion of transportation facilities to meet requirements of the war in Korea. SURFACE SHIPMENT Because of the high tonnages involved, the basic transportation channel for material was, of necessity, surface shipping. At the beginning of the Project, estimates were made of cargo requirements, but, because of the greatly increased scope of the work, these were greatly exceeded. Table 14.2-1 shows a comparison of estimated and actual cargo tonnages by months. It will be noted that after March 1950, the estimated cargo require ments were 300 measurement tons per month, which included dry provisions and and chiiled and frozen provisions. This was considered to be a maintenance figure which would obtain for the remainder of the Project, as it was expected that all basic construction equipment and material would be at the site by that date. It will also be noted that as of Marck 1950, the actual and estimated cumulative cargo were in agreement within 7 measurement tons. From that date forward, the actual tonnage soared upward radically because of the addition of the Military Struc- tures Program, the Scientific Structures Program, and a general increase in the scope of the Project. For the twenty-four months from June 1949 to May 1951 inclusive, the total tonnage actually shipped averaged 2810 measurement tons per month. Throughout the Project, because of limitations on warehousing space and the shortage of personnel to devote to stevedoring, it was necessary that cargo be so scheduled that it would arrive at the Project at intervals ofnot exceeding thirty days. It was accordingly arranged with Naval personnel at the conferences at CincPac in June 1949 that ons general eargo ship and one refrigerator ship would sail from Oakland at intervals of approximately thirty days, each carrying H & N cargo. It was anticipated that the space allocated to H & N would be adequate for requirements. It was necessary that items of equipment and construction material arrive at Oakland on a schedule as designated to accommodate the construction schedule. After negotiation with Naval authorities, the Western Sea Frontier was designated as the liaison channel for Navy logistic support on the West Coast. Working arrange- ments were made with the warehousing and ship loading agencies of the Navy at Oakland, and later with MSTS when it was established. In actual practice, certain difficulties developed in the shipping arrangements. These were unanticipated and caused serious dislocations in the orderly progress of construction. 14-6 Most of these difficulties