any organ, since the 10 r in 30 years was set for external radiation that penetrates the whole body. (The conclusion remains unchanged even when the medical x-ray dose to the population is subtracted from the 10 r dose in 30 years.) It will be seen that this appraisal of the tolerability of possible genetic and somatic damage does not involve the estimation of the number of possibly injured individuals or the degree of damage. The appraisal is made on the basis of dose rates, which are more readily determinable. The usual assumption that the effect is proportional to the dose rate was madein calculating the 9 per cent and 17 per cent figures given above. However, this is not essential because, if the dose rate in the tissue of interest is considerably lower than 0.33 rad per year, the effect is bound to be considerably less than that attributable in 10 r in 30 years. Nevertheless, it was thought desirable to include in this review the numerical estimates given in the preceding sections. 6 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS As previously stated, the setting of an upper limit of 10 r in 30 years for the genetic dose to the population of the United States involved an estimated balance between possible harm and possible benefit. Since it must be assumed that some harm will result from fallout radiation, the question naturally arises as to whether this is justified by the benefit, even if it be well within recommendedlimits. In this eountry a large fraction of the annual budgetis for military expenditures, which in a democracy gives a measureof the citizens’ concern about the safety of their country. It seems obvious, therefore, that if we wish to maintain a first class military organization for the safety of the country, we must at least keep abreast of new weapons developments. No such developments can be carried out successfully without tests. (Obviously, it would be impossible for the Air Force to develop better military planes without ever testing them in flight.) Therefore, in terms of national security, necessary tests of nuclear weapons are justified. There are, however, other considerations that must be weighed carefully by those responsible for our national policy. Radioactive fallout from our tests spreads all over the world. Similarly, tests made by others affect us. Other countries may want to develop nuclear weapons later. In time, the situation may well become serious. Estimates of ultimate damage to the world’s present and future population, expressed in absolute terms, are large and impress many people. Judging from discussions in the public press, it is not generally realized that the estimated damage is well within tolerable limits, applicable to radiation exposure of the whole population in its normal peacetime activities. The question arises in the minds of many thoughtful persons whether the number and power of bombs expioded in the tests are being kept at the minimum consistent with scientific and military requirements. In view of the adverse repercussions caused by the testing of nuclegt weapons,the Committee retommends that tests be held toa minimum consistent with sttenttfic and military requirements and that appropriate steps be taken to correct the present status of confusion on the part of the public. October 1957. yee 276